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Abstract. This paper is an extensive study of the issues of efﬁcient software
implementation of low genus hyperelliptic Jacobians over binary ﬁelds.
We ﬁrst give a detailed description of the methods by which one obtains explicit
formulæ from Cantor’s algorithm. We then present improvements on the best
known explicit formulæ for curves of genus three and four. Special routines for
multiplying vectors of ﬁeld elements by a ﬁxed quantity (which are much faster
than performing the multiplications separately) are also deployed, and the explicit
formulæ for all genera are redesigned or re-implemented accordingly.
To allow a fair comparison of the curves of different genera, we use a highly
optimized software library for arithmetic in binary ﬁelds. Our goals in its devel-
opment were to minimize the overheads and performance penalties associated
to granularity problems, which have a larger impact as the genus of the curves
increases. The current state of the art in attacks against the discrete logarithm
problem is taken into account for the choice of the ﬁeld and group sizes and
performance tests are done on a personal computer.
Our results can be shortly summarized as follows: Curves of genus three provide
performance similar, or better, to that of curves of genus two, and these two types
of curves perform consistently around 50% faster than elliptic curves; Curves of
genus four attain a performance level comparable to, and more often than not,
better than, elliptic curves. A large choice of curves is therefore available for the
deployment of curve based cryptography, with curves of genus three and four
providing their own advantages as larger cofactors can be allowed for the group
order.
Keywords. Elliptic and hyperelliptic curves, cryptography, efﬁcient implementa-
tion, binary ﬁeld arithmetic, explicit formulæ
1 Introduction
Thediscrete logarithmproblem(DLP) is a quite popularprimitivein thedesignof cryp-
tosystems. It can be formulatedas follows: Given a group G generated by an element g,
and a second element h ∈ G, ﬁnd some t ∈ Z witht·g =h (this integer is called the dis-
crete logarithmof h with respect to g). The computation of scalar multiples of elementsof a group (i.e. given an integer t and an element g, compute t ·g) is the fundamental
operation of a DLP-based cryptosystem.
Systems based on the DLP in the Jacobian of curves over ﬁnite ﬁelds were con-
sidered as early as 1985, when Miller [44] and Koblitz [27] independently proposed
to use elliptic curves (EC). Shortly thereafter Koblitz [29] suggested the Jacobians of
hyperelliptic curves (HEC) of higher genus (EC are HEC of genus one).
After a slow start, the use of EC in cryptography has now gained momentum and
there are several books covering the subject (for example [6,23,7,1]). HEC have been
enjoying increasing attention in recent years. They have long been considered as not
competitive with EC because of construction and performance issues, but the situation
has changed in the last few years. It is now possible to efﬁciently construct HEC whose
Jacobian has cryptographically good order (for an overview see [36]), and the perfor-
mance has been considerably improved. For curves of genus two over binary ﬁelds, the
fastest explicit formulæ are given in [34], and active research has also been done for
other genera. A recent summary can be found in [9,10], but of course research has not
stopped: Recent improvements for genus three can be found in [13], and further results
for genus three and four are the main subject of the present paper.
No subexponential algorithm is known for solving the DLP on elliptic and hyper-
elliptic curves of genus at most four (cfr. [3–5] for an overview of the techniques in-
volved). For curves of genus one and two, the index calculus method is not faster than
Pollard’s methods,thereforethe security level of these curves is assessed by the number
of operations required to solve the DLP with Pollard’s Rho algorithm.
For curves deﬁned over a ﬁxed ﬁeld and increasing genus the complexity of com-
putinging the discrete logarithm becomes subexponential in the group order [12] by
using index calculus methods (see also [4]), but for “small”, ﬁxed genus the complex-
ity of the methods remains exponential. Starting with genus three, one has to take into
account a loss of security by a constant factor, and therefore one has to increase the
ﬁeld size because the index calculus techniques start to become faster than Pollard’s
methods.
On the other hand, the best algorithms for solving the factorization problem and the
DLP in ﬁnite ﬁelds are subexponential.Therefore, to achieve a security increase equiv-
alent to doubling the RSA key size, one needs to add only a few bits to an EC group.
For example, according to [35] the security of 1323 bit RSA (or of a 137 bits subgroup
of a 1024 bit ﬁnite ﬁeld) is attained by an EC over a 157 bit ﬁeld and with a group
of prime order (of 157 bits). For that same level of security, the ﬁeld would have 79
bits for a HEC of genus two, 59 bits for genus three and 53 bits for genus four (for all
three, the curve must have a prime subgroup of order at least 157 bits); In comparison,
the security of 2048 bits RSA is (roughly) achieved by 200-bits curve groups, and that
of 3072 bits RSA by 240-bits curve groups [11]. NIST [49] suggests to use 224 and
256 bit groups in place of the values 200 and 240. There are obvious bandwidth and
performance advantages in using curve based systems, in particular when the security
requirements increase: Curves of genus up to three are now heavily investigated alter-
natives. One of the purposes of this paper will be to show that systems based on curves
of genus four may also prove interesting.
2In this paper we reconsider the issue of efﬁcient implementation of low genus hy-
perelliptic Jacobians.Our focus is on curvesoverﬁelds of characteristictwo. We brieﬂy
recall the state of the art of implementation of HEC arithmetic in low genus: This will
motivate our investigations.
Explicit formulæ for curves of genus two have been studied extensively [24,40,31,
51,34,33], both in the odd and even characteristic cases. An overview of the different
results can be found in [10]. In particular, the fastest known algorithm for curves over
binary ﬁelds makes use of the doubling formula by Lange and Stevens [34]: In that
paper, the authors use Shoup’s NTL software library [57] for the arithmetic in the base
ﬁeld, andobtainthatthe best case forcurvesof genustwo canperformabout10% better
than elliptic curves.
Thereare also a numberof papers onexplicit formulæfor curvesof genus three [47,
31,21,13] in both odd and even characteristic, with a very complete description of all
cases in [21].A detailedcomparisonsbetweentheperformancesof curvesofgenusone,
two, and three in odd characteristic can be found in [2] and for characteristic two some
comparisons are found in [59].
The literature is much more restricted when it comes to curves of genus four, with
only the formulæ of Pelzl, Wollinger and Paar for characteristic two [51], and no de-
tailed comparisonwith the performanceof othergenerathat includesa securityanalysis
and a careful choice of ﬁelds.
This paper reconsiders the issue of implementing low genus hyperelliptic Jacobian
arithmetic over ﬁnite ﬁelds of even characteristic. A difference with respect to existing
literature is that we simultaneously address ﬁeld arithmetic enhancements, the deriva-
tion of the explicit formulæ and the impact of recent attacks, and consider the interplay
of these factors. This produces surprising implementation results, which can be listed
in the following two groupings:
1. A thorough approach to ﬁnite ﬁeld implementation can be used to deliver perfor-
mance essentially independentof the granularityof the computingarchitecture em-
ployed. In other words, the timings of the multiplication in the ﬁeld is a close ap-
proximationof the quadratic bit complexityof (small) multiplication. Special ﬁnite
ﬁeld functions can be used to speed up explicit formulæ by up to 20% and the
impact of such functions increases with the genus.
2. The genus two formulæ by Lange and Stevens in even characteristic can be used
to beat EC performance by as much as 50% but curves of genus three deliver sim-
ilar performance while using even smaller ﬁelds. Moreover, curves of genus four
perform in fact quite well, often matching or improving EC performance.
Section 2 gives a detailed overview the general technique used to derive explicit
formulæ. In Section 3 we describe our approach to implementation of the underly-
ing ﬁeld arithmetic: The technique of sequential multiplications is introduced. Our im-
provements to the explicit formulæ are presented in Section 4. Security considerations
are the subject of Section 5, where key and ﬁeld size equivalence issues are addressed.
A description of our experiments and the corresponding results are given in Section 6.
Finally, in Section 7 we draw conclusions.
32 From Cantor’s algorithm to explicit formulæ
An excellent, low brow, introduction to hyperelliptic curves is [43], including elemen-
tary proofs of many facts used implicitly below. A more geometric presentation of the
theoretical background is given in [1].
Let Fq be a ﬁnite ﬁeld of characteristic two. Let us consider a hyperelliptic curve of
genus g explicitly given by an equation of the form
C : y2+h(x)y = f(x)
over the ﬁeld Fq, with deg(f)=2g+1 and deg(h) ≤ g.
Let ∞ be the point at inﬁnity on the curve. In general, the points on a hyperelliptic
curve do not form a group (the notable exception being represented by the hyperelliptic
curves of genus one, i.e. the elliptic curves). Instead, the divisor class group of C is
used: We brieﬂy recall its main properties. The divisor class group is isomorphic to,
and sometimes identiﬁed with, the algebraic variety called the JacobianofC, which we
do not deﬁne nor study here.
A divisor D is a formal sum of points on the curve, considered with multiplicities,
or, in other words, any element of the free Abelian group Z[C(F q)]. Its degree is the
sum of those multiplicities, and its support the set of points with nonzero multiplicity.
We are interested in the divisors of degree zero given by sums of the form
k
∑
i=1
miPi−m∞ : Pi ∈C \{∞} (1)
where m = ∑
k
i=1mi. The degree of the associated effective divisor ∑
k
i=1miPi is the inte-
ger m. The points Pi form the ﬁnite support of D. The principal divisors are the divisors
of functions, i.e. those whose points are the poles and zeros of a rational function on
the curve, the multiplicity of each point being the order of the zero or minus the order
of the pole at that point. The divisor class group is the quotientgroup of the degree zero
divisors modulo the principal divisors. In each divisor class there exists a unique ele-
ment of the form (1) with (effective) degree m ≤ g. Such an element is called a reduced
divisor.
The group elements are these reduced divisors and they can be represented as pairs
of polynomials [u(x),v(x)] satisfying:
1. deg(u) ≤ g (i.e. the roots of u(x) are the x–coordinates of the points belonging to
the ﬁnite support of the divisor);
2. deg(v) < deg(u);
3. v(xPi)=yPi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m (i.e. the polynomial v(t) interpolates these points);
4. u(x) divides v(x)2+v(x)h(x)− f(x).
This representation is usually attributed to Mumford [46]. If the ﬁrst degree condition
is not satisﬁed, the divisor is called semi-reduced.
For computation purposes, the group operation is based on Cantor’s algorithm [8],
that operates directly with elements in Mumford’srepresentation.Cantor’s original ver-
sion worked only in odd characteristic and was extended for all ﬁelds by Koblitz [29].
Algorithm 1 gives the algorithm restricted to curves of characteristic two.
4Algorithm 1. Group operation for hyperelliptic Jacobians in characteristic two
INPUT: Reduced divisors D1 =[ u1(x),v1(x)] and D2 =[ u2(x),v2(x)]
OUTPUT: Reduced divisor D3 =[ u3(x),v3(x)], D3 = D1+D2
1. Composition: [uC,vC]=D1+D2 (semi-reduced)
2. d1 ← gcd(u1,u2)
where d1 = s1u1+s2u2 [Extended Euclidean Algorithm]
3. d(x) ← gcd(d1,v1+v2+h2)
where d =t1d1+t2(v1+v2 +h) [Extended Euclidean Algorithm]
4. r1 ← s1t1, r2 ← s2t1 and r3 ←t2
5. uC ← u1u2/d2
6. vC ← v2+ u2
d r2(v1+v2)+r3
v2
2+hv2+f
d
7. Reduction: D3 =[ u3,v3] (reduced)
8. ˜ u0 ← uC, ˜ v0 ← vC
9. for i = 0 while deg(˜ ui) > g do
10. ˜ ui+1 ← Monic
 
˜ v2
i +h˜ vi+f
˜ ui
 
11. ˜ vi+1 ← ˜ vi+h mod ˜ ui+1
12. i ← i+1
13. u3 ← ˜ ui, v3 ← ˜ vi
Note that at step 6 we are simply computing vC(x) to be congruent to v1(x) modulo
u1(x)/d(x) and congruent to v2(x) modulo u2(x)/d(x).
The idea behind explicit formulæ is to replace the polynomial-based form of Can-
tor’s algorithm by a coefﬁcient-based approach. These formulæ are case-speciﬁc, i.e.
they depend on whether the divisors are distinct (addition) or equal (doubling), on the
degreesofthepolynomialsinvolved,etc.(Foradetailedcase considerationingenustwo
see three see for example [33]; for genus three see [21].) This approach has a number
of advantages which result in a signiﬁcant speed-up in the computations:
– Conditional statements can be reduced to a minimum. Polynomial arithmetic is
inherently dependent on conditional loops (mainly on the degree of the polyno-
mial), which cannot be avoided in a general setting. Although checking a condi-
tional statement (for example “is k < deg(u)?”) is not very expensive on its own,
the cumulative impact over the whole algorithm should not be ignored.
– Coefﬁcients which have no impact on the ﬁnal result are no longer computed. This
is quite evident in step 10 where we do not compute the coefﬁcients of x of degree
less than deg(˜ ui) in ˜ v2
i +h˜ vi+ f, since we know that the division
˜ v2
i +h˜ vi+f
˜ ui is exact
and thus has no fractional part.
– In Cantor’s algorithm, some of the partial computations may be done twice, with
only the variable names being different. These duplications are avoided in the ex-
plicit formulæ – by keeping those values in memory.
5– Parts of the algorithm can be replaced by more efﬁcient techniques that cannot be
usedina generalsetting.Sections4.1and4.2aregoodexamplesofthesesituations.
We also take advantage of the following observations:
– For almost all reduced divisors D =[ u(x),v(x)], u(x) has degree g.
– For almost all pairs of polynomialsu and v such that u divides v2+hv+ f, v mod u
has degree deg(u)−1.
– Almost all randomly chosen polynomials are relatively coprime.
(These are standard assumptions which are made by nearly every author in the devel-
opment of explicit formulæ, beginning with Harley [24]). In all three of these cases,
“almost-all” can be interpreted as “all but a proportion of size O(g/q)”. This means
that if we concentrateon developingadditions formulæwhich applyto the most general
case (i.e. assuming that all polynomials have maximal degree and non-related polyno-
mials are coprime) then only a negligible proportion of all group operations requires a
different implementation. From the point of view of efﬁciency, we can handle all other
cases with the generalCantoralgorithmwithout havinga noticeableimpact onthe com-
putation of [e]D (via a double-and-addapproach), so only the general case is discussed
here.
To reduce computational cost (mostly for the doublings), we restrict ourselves to
curves of the form
y2+y = x7+ f5x5+ f3x3+ f1x+ f0 (2)
for genus three and of the form
y2+y = x9+ f7x7+ f5x5+ f3x3+ f1x+ f0 (3)
for genus four (the security of curves of these special forms is discussed in Section 5).
As already mentioned, we consider only the most common case of the addition and
doubling formulæ, i.e. when the degrees are maximal, and (for the addition formula)
when u1 and u2 are coprime.
The form of the most common case for the addition and doubling formulæ are very
similar for genus three and four (except for the degrees of the polynomials, obviously)
since we need to go through the reduction loop twice to obtain a reduced divisor. The
only major difference is that
˜ v2
1+h˜ v1+f
˜ u1 is already monic in the genus three formulæ
(since the leading coefﬁcient in the denominator comes from f(x)) but must be made
monic for the genus four formulæ.
Since the formulæ are in terms of the coefﬁcients instead of polynomials, we will
denote pi the coefﬁcient of xi in p(x). As there could easily be confusions with the
polynomials u1(x), u2(x) and u3(x), as well as v1(x), v2(x) and v3(x), we will denote
their coefﬁcients differently:
– u1(x)=a0+a1x+a2x2+x3 (genus g = 3) or
u1(x)=a0+a1x+a2x2+a3x3+x4 (genus g = 4);
– u2(x)=b0+b1x+b2x2+x3 (g=3) or u2(x)=b0+b1x+b2x2+b3x3+x4 (g=4);
– v1(x)=c0+c1x+c2x2 (g = 3) or v1(x)=c0+c1x+c2x2+c3x3 (g = 4);
– v2(x)=d0+d1x+d2x2 (g = 3) or v2(x)=d0+d1x+d2x2+d3x3 (g = 4);
6– u3(x)=e0+e1x+e2x2+x3 (g= 3) or u3(x)=e0+e1x+e2x2+e3x3+x4 (g = 4);
– v3(x)=ε0+ε1x+ε2x2 (g = 3) or v3(x)=ε0+ε1x+ε2x2+ε3x3 (g = 4).
We also replace ˜ u1(x) and ˜ v1(x) from steps 10 and 11 by uT(x) and vT(x).
2.1 Addition formula
For the addition, we want to compute D1 +D2 where D1 =[ u1(x),v1(x)] and D2 =
[u2(x),v2(x)], with deg(u1)=deg(u2)=g,de g (v1)=deg(v2)=g−1andgcd(u1,u2)=
1.
At step2,we haved1 =gcd(u1,u2)=1 withs1 ≡u−1
1 mod u2 ands2 ≡u−1
2 mod u1.
For step 3, we simply have d =gcd(1,v1+v2+h)=1 with t1 = 1 andt2 =0, so we get
r1 = u−1
1 mod u2, r2 = u−1
2 mod u1 and r3 = 0 at step 4. We then have
uC = u1u2
at step 5 and
vC = v1+u1(u−1
1 mod u2)(v1+v2) mod uC
at step 6.
The next idea consists of writing vC(x) in terms of multiples of u1(x), i.e. as v1(x)+
s(x)u1(x) where s =( u−1
1 mod u2)(v1 +v2) mod u2. Since we must do two reduction
steps to obtain a reduced divisor, we can substitute the values of uC and vC (and h(x)=
1) in the ﬁrst reduction step to simplify the equations:
uT = Monic
 
(v1+su1)2+(v1+su1)+f
u1u2
 
= Monic
 
(v2
1+s2u2
1+v1+su1+ f
u1u2
 
= Monic
 
v2
1+hv1+ f
u1u2
+
s2u1
u2
+
s
u2
 
(4)
and
vT = v1+su1+1 mod uT .
By construction of uC and vC, the division in step 10 is exact, so we can look at the
quotient (denoted [·]) and ignore the fractional parts of each of the terms in Equation 4.
–
 
v2
1+hv1+f
u1u2
 
is linear of the form x+  where   is ag−1+bg−1 (the sum of the coef-
ﬁcients of xg−1 in u1 and u2).
–
 
s
u2
 
= 0 since deg(s) < deg(u2).
– The bulk of the computation is in
 
s2u1
u2
 
. Even though su1 is required to compute
vT, it is more efﬁcient to compute s2u1 by ﬁrst squaring s and then multiplying by
u1 (in s2, odd powers of x have coefﬁcient 0).
7We now observe that the leading term in
 
s2u1
u2
 
(and therefore of
v2
C+hvC+f
uC as well)
is the square of the leading term of s. An easy way of making uT monic is then to ﬁrst
make s monic and use this new polynomial (we call it ˜ s) in the computation of u T.
In terms of the number of operations, it is less expensive to compute ˜ s and
 
˜ s2u1
u2
 
and
multiply
 
v2
1+hv1+f
u1u2
 
by the correspondingfactor than to computethe whole polynomial
from s before making it monic.
On its own, this change has a minimal impact, but it becomes very successful when
combined with another idea: Replacing u−1
1 mod u2 (in the computation of s)b ya n
almost inverse (the product of the inverse by a constant r). Many methods to compute
u−1
1 mod u2 do in fact computean almost inverseﬁrst and then multiplyit by r −1 to ﬁnd
the real inverse. n the extended Euclidean algorithm for example, one can delay all the
ﬁeld inversions and work with multiples of the intermediate polynomials by a common
factor, thus computing an almost inverse (the ﬁnal common factor is our constant r).
Then, the inverse is obtained via a ﬁnal division by r (as Nagao [47] and [37] do),
which we however do not perform. This idea is quite easy to implement. From the
inv(x), the almost inverse of u1(x) modulo u2(x), we can deﬁne s (x)=inv(x)(v1(x)+
v2(x)) mod u2(x) and use it instead of s(x).
The main advantage is that computing ˜ s from s or s  requires the same amount
of work, so it is much more efﬁcient to skip the computation of s. Once s (x) and r
are known, is it relatively easy to compute ˜ s, sg−1 and sg−1
−2,s ouT and vT can be
computed as
uT =
 
˜ s2u1
u2
 
+sg−1
−2(x+ag−1+bg−1)
vT = v1+sg−1˜ su1+1 mod uT .
2.2 Doubling formula
The reason for choosing h(x)=1 becomes apparent in the doubling formula. Here we
want to compute D1+D1 with D1 =[ u1(x),v1(x)],d e g (u1)=g and deg(v1)=g−1.
At step 2, we have d1 = gcd(u1,u1)=u1 (we can set s1 = 1 and s2 = 0, but this
is of no consequence). In step 3, we ﬁnd d = gcd(u1,2u1 +h)=gcd(u1,1)=1 with
t1 = 0 and t2 = 1, so r1 = r2 = 0 and r3 = 1 in step 4. This choice of r1, r2 and r3 is
very favorable since we get uC = u2
1 (at step 5) and vC = v2
1 + f mod uC (at step 6).
The computation of uC(x) and vC(x) can then be done in only 2g ﬁeld squarings (g to
compute u2
1 and g to compute v2
1).
Thecompositionstepcanthereforebecomputedmuchfasterthanforgenericcurves
(with deg(h)=g). Since uC and vC can be computed at very little cost, there is no need
to combinethis step with the ﬁrst reduction.The two reductionsteps are then done as in
Cantor’s algorithm, but with a number of coefﬁcients known to be zero (which further
reduces the cost).
8Algorithm 2. Group addition, most common case
INPUT: Reduced divisors D1 =[ u1(x),v1(x)] and D2 =[ u2(x),v2(x)]
OUTPUT: Reduced divisor D3 =[ u3(x),v3(x)], D3 = D1+D2
1. Almost inverse, inv(x)=r·u1(x)−1 mod u2(x), via Cramer’s rule
2. r = inv(x)·u1(x) mod u2(x)
3. s (x)=r·s(x), where s(x)=u1(x)−1·(v2(x)+v1(x)) mod u2(x)
4. computation of inverses and ˜ s(x) (s (x) made monic)
5. uT(x)=
 
˜ s(x)2u1(x)
u2(x)
 
+sg−1
−2 
x+ag−1+bg−1
 
6. z(x)=˜ s(x)u1(x)
7. vT(x)=sg−1z(x)+v1(x)+1 mod uT(x)
8. u3(x)=Monic
 
f(x)+vT(x)+vT(x)2
uT(x)
 
9. v3(x)=vT(x)+1 mod u3(x)
Algorithm 3. Group doubling, most common case
INPUT: Reduced divisors D1 =[ u1(x),v1(x)] and D2 =[ u2(x),v2(x)]
OUTPUT: Reduced divisor D3 =[ u3(x),v3(x)], D3 = D1+D2
1. uC(x)=u1(x)2
2. vC(x)=v1(x)2+ f(x) mod uC(x)
3. computation of inverses
4. uT(x)=Monic
 
f(x)+vC(x)+vC(x)2
uC(x)
 
5. vT(x)=vC(x)+1 mod uT(x)
6. u3(x)=Monic
 
f(x)+vT(x)+vT(x)2
uT(x)
 
7. v3(x)=vT(x)+1 mod u3(x)
93 Field Arithmetic
Field arithmetic efﬁciency is crucial to the speed of the implementation of curve arith-
metic. Its realization is often the Achilles’ heel of HEC implementations. In [2] it is
shown that HEC in odd characteristic are heavily penalized in most comparisons to EC,
because of many types of overheads in the ﬁeld arithmetic whose impact increases as
ﬁeld sizes get smaller. This is also the case in characteristic2,but the natureof theworst
overheads and the techniques used to address them differ.
1. Using loops to process operands produces expensive branch mispredictions, whose
cost is heavier for shorter loops.
Smallerﬁeldsarethusmorepenalized.Thisissueis addressedbyfullloopunrolling
for all input sizes, for example in the implementation of the schoolbook multipli-
cation used to implement the underlying integer arithmetic. This is a very common
implementation practice. Loop unrolling is also useful in even characteristic, but
the way it is used is different: For details see Subsection 3.1.
2. Inlining can often be used to reduce function call overheads.
Forprimeﬁeld ofsmallsizes, inliningmultiplicationsmakes abigdifference.How-
ever, the binary ﬁeld multiplication code is much larger than the code for a multi-
precision integer multiplication of the same size. Thereforeinlining would result in
code size explosion causing big performancedrops. In the even characteristic case,
all multiplications,squarings and inversions are done using functioncalls, and only
additions and comparisons are inlined.
3. The cost of a modular reduction relative to the multiprecision multiplication in-
creases as operands size decreases.
Therefore in odd characteristic HEC implementations more time is spent doing
modular reductions than in EC implementations. This issue was addressed in [2]
by delaying modular reductions for sums of products of two operands.
In even characteristic, the reduction modulo the irreducible polynomial deﬁning
the ﬁeld extension is much cheaper, and the advantages of delaying modular re-
ductions is debatable: The additional memory trafﬁc involved can lead to reduced
performance.Afterdoingsome atomicoperationcountsandsome testing,weopted
not to implement it.
4. Architecture granularity also induces irregular performance penalties.
A 32-bits CPU usually processes 32-bits operands, and we say that the architec-
ture has a granularity of 32 bits. Similarly, Granularity issues may affect curves of
higher genus more than elliptic curves: An elliptic curve over a 223-bits ﬁeld uses
7 words operands, but a curve of genus two offering similar security needs a ﬁeld
of approximately 112 bits, i.e. 4 words operands. The number of ﬁeld multiplica-
tions for a group operation increases roughly quadratically with the genus, but in
this scenario the cost of a ﬁeld multiplication in the smaller ﬁeld is about 33% of
the cost of a multiplication in the larger ﬁeld. As a result the HEC of genus two is
penalized by a factor of 1.32by granularity alone.
Notmuchcanbedonetodefeatgranularityproblemsinthelargeprimeﬁeldcase.A
partial solution [2] applies when operand sizes are between 32n−31 and 32n−16
bits. It consists of using half-word operands for the most signiﬁcant bits, reducing
10memory accesses, and speeding up modular reduction. The savings are however
limited and are more noticeable for n = 2 (i.e. in the 33 to 48 bits range) than for
larger values of n. The technique can also be used in even characteristic, however,
the problem of granularity in even characteristic can be addressed more thoroughly
as we show in Subsection 3.1.
5. In the explicit formulæ, sometimes several different ﬁeld elements are multiplied by
the same ﬁeld element.
This situation is similar to the multiplication of vector by a scalar, and it is pos-
sible to speed up these multiplications appreciably. The technique for doing this
is described in Subsection 3.2. Similar optimization techniques do not seem to be
possible in the prime ﬁeld case.
The next two Subsections look at the implementation of ﬁeld multiplication (Sub-
section 3.1) and at the technique of sequential multiplications (Subsection 3.2). Squar-
ing are described in Subsection 3.3, modular inversion in Subsection 3.4, and modular
reduction in Subsection 3.5. We conclude the section with the performance results for
ﬁeld arithmetic (Subsection 3.6).
A ﬁeld F2n is representedusing a polynomialbasis as the quotientring F2[t]/(p(t)),
where p(t) is an irreducible polynomial of degree n. Elements of the ﬁeld are rep-
resented by binary polynomials of degree less than n. To perform multiplication (resp.
squaring)inF2n, thepolynomial(s)representingthe input(s)areﬁrst multipliedtogether
(resp. squared), and the result is then reduced modulo p(t).
3.1 Field multiplication and architecture granularity
The starting point for our implementation of ﬁeld multiplication is the algorithm by
L´ opez and Dahab [39], which is based on the comb exponentiation method by Lim and
Lee [38]. ([23, Subsection 2.3] also describes this method.) It is given as Algorithm 4.
Note that if u = 0 in Step 6, then Steps 7–8 may be skipped. However, inserting
an “if u  = 0” statement before Step 7 slows down the algorithm in practice, because
the implied branch cannot successfully be predicted by the CPU, and frequent pipeline
ﬂushes cannot be avoided.
There are a few obvious optimizations of Algorithm 4. The ﬁrst one applies if the
operands are at most sγ−w+1 bits long. In this case the polynomials Pj(t) ﬁti ns
words, and the loop beginning at Step 7 requires k to go from 0 to s−1 only.
Thesecondoptimizationappliesif operandsarebetweensγ−w+2andsγ bits long.
We proceed as follows: First, zero the w−1 most signiﬁcant bits of A for the compu-
tations in Steps 2 and 3, thus obtaining the polynomials Pj(t) that ﬁti ns words; Then,
perform the computation as in the case of shorter operands, thus in Step 7 the upper
bound for k is s−1; Finally, add the multiples of B(t) corresponding to the most w−1
most signiﬁcant bits of A to R before returning the result. This leads to a much faster
implementation since a lot of memory writes in Step 2 and memory reads in Step 8 are
traded for a minimal amount of memory operations later. This approach is commonly
used for generic implementations of binary polynomial multiplication.
More optimizations can be applied if the ﬁeld size is known in advance. Firstly,
as the lengths of all the loops are known in advance it is possible to do partial or full
11Algorithm 4. Field multiplication [LD00]
INPUT: A =( As−1,...,A0), B =( Bs−1,...,B0), and a comb size w
OUTPUT: R =( R2s−1,...,R0)=A×B
1. for j = 0 to 2w−1 do
2. Pj(t) ← (jw−1tw−1+···+ j1t+ j0)A(t) where j =(jw−1 ... j2 j1 j0)2.
[Here the polynomial Pj(t) is at most s+1 words long]
3. for i = 0,...,2s−1 do Ri ← 0
4. for j = s−1 downto 0 do
5. for i = 0 to s−1 do
6. u ← (Bi >> jw) mod tw [mask out w bits at time]
7. for k = 0 to s do
8. Rk+i ← Rk+i ⊕Pu[k]
9. If j  = 0 then R ← twR [bit shift]
10. return R
loop unrolling. Secondly, some operands (containing the most signiﬁcant bits of R) are
known to be zero in the ﬁrst runs of the loops, hence parts of the computation can be
skipped. To do this the main loop in j will be split in two (or more) parts whose ranges
cover the full range of the original loop, but some operations will be omitted in the ﬁrst
parts.
We considered different comb sizes and different loop splitting and unrolling tech-
niques for 25 different input sizes, ranging from 41 to 269 bits. Of these sizes, only 22
were actually used with the group operations for our tests.
Special treatment is reserved to polynomials whose size is just a few bits more
than a multiple k of the architecture granularity. Two such cases are 67 and 97 bits
polynomialswhere the valuesof k are 64 and96, resp.We performscalar multiplication
of the polynomials consisting of the lower k bits ﬁrst, and then handle the remaining
most signiﬁcantbits one byone.This givessigniﬁcantlyfaster code(by10to 15%)than
optimizing and shortening the 96 and 128 bits multiplication by the previous approach.
Multiplication of polynomials whose degree is high enough is also done using the
well known trick of Karatubsa [26] that reduces the multiplication of two s-bits poly-
nomials to three multiplications of s/2-bits polynomials. We also observe that on the
PowerPC, Karatsuba multiplication already performs slightly better than comb-based
multiplication with operands that are 6 words long (the 3 half-size multiplications are
then performed by the comb method).
The performance of multiplication routines can be seen (among other things) in Ta-
ble 1 andFigure 1. This will be discussed in detail in Subsection3.6, but we can already
observe that the cost of multiplication grows quite smoothly with the ﬁeld size, and in
12fact approaches the curve of the quadratic theoretical bit complexity of multiplication
much better than a simpler approach that works at the word level.
3.2 Sequential multiplications
In the explicit formulæ for the curves of genus two to four, we can ﬁnd several sets
of multiplications with one of terms in common. At this point it is natural to decide
to preserve the precomputations (Steps 1 and 2 of Algorithm 4) associated to one ﬁeld
element and to re-use them in the next multiplications. However, this would require a
lot of extra variables in the implementation of the explicit formulæ and memory man-
agement techniques. We therefore opted for a simpler approach: We wrote routines that
perform the precomputations once and then repeat the Steps 3 to 10 of Algorithm 4
for each multiplication. We call this type of operation sequential multiplication (scalar
multiplication would be more correct, but in our context this terminology is already
used...).
It turns out that the optimal comb size for a single multiplication (on a given archi-
tecture) may not be optimal for 2, 3, or more multiplications, so we adapt the comb size
to the number of multiplications that are performed together. For example, for the 73
bits ﬁeld on the PowerPC, a comb of size 3 is optimal for the single multiplication and
for pairs of multiplications (sequences of 2 multiplications), but for 3 to 5 multiplica-
tions the optimal comb of size is 4. For 89 bits ﬁelds, the optimal comb size for single
multiplications is still 3, but it is 4 already for the double multiplication.
If a comb method is used for 6-word ﬁelds on our target architecture, then 4 is
the optimal size for single multiplications and 5 is the optimal size for groups of at
least 3multiplications.As we mentionedin Subsection3.1,Karatsubaperformsslightly
better for the single multiplications and the same method is also used in the sequential
multiplications, where a sequential multiplication of s-word operands is turned into
three sequential multiplications of s/2-word operands.
In order to keep function call overheads low and to avoid the use of virtual param-
eter lists in C, the sequential multiplication procedures for at least 3 multiplications
require the input and output vectors to consist of elements which are adjacent in mem-
ory. This can also speed up memory accesses, since successive parameters are stored in
consecutive memory locations, better exploiting the structure of modern caches.
For historical reasons, we need to mention that using static precomputationshas al-
ready been done for multiplications by a constant parameter (coming from the curve or
the ﬁeld) – this is for example suggested in the context of square root extractionin [14].
We found no references on adapting the comb size to the number of multiplications by
the same value.
3.3 Polynomial squaring
Squaring is a linear operation in even characteristic: If p(t)=∑
n
i=0eiti where ei ∈ F2,
then
 
p(t)
 2 = ∑
n
i=0eit2i. In other words, the result is obtained by inserting a zero bit
between each two adjacent bits of the polynomial to be squared. To efﬁciently imple-
ment this process, a 512-byte table is precomputed for converting 8-bits polynomials
into their expanded 16-bits counterparts [56].
133.4 Modular inversion
There are several different algorithms for computing the inverse of a polynomial a(t)
modulo another polynomial p(t), where both polynomials are deﬁned over the ﬁeld F 2.
In [22] three different methods are described (see also [23, Subsection 2.3]):
– The Extended Euclidean Algorithm (EEA), where the partial quotients are approx-
imated by powers of t, hence no polynomial division is required, but only a com-
parison of degrees.
– The Almost Inverse Algorithm (AIA), which is a variant of the binary extended
GCD algorithmwhere the ﬁnal result is given as a polynomialb(t) together with an
integer k such that b(t)a(t)≡tk (mod p(t)). The ﬁnal result must then be adjusted.
– The Modiﬁed Almost Inverse Algorithm (MAIA), which is a variant of the binary
extended GCD algorithm which returns the correct inverse as a result.
We refer to [22] for details.
Depending on the nature of the different parameters, it can be assumed that each
algorithm can be faster than the other two. However our experiments agree with the
results in [22] and we ﬁnd that EEA performs consistently better than the other two
methods.
In our implementations with inputs of up to 8 words we always keep all words
(limbs) of all multiprecision operands in separate integer variables explicitly, not in
indexed arrays. This allows the compiler to reserve a register for each of these inte-
ger variables if enough registers are provided by the architecture (such as on RISC
processors). Furthermore, it does not penalize register-starved CISC architectures: the
contents of many registers containing individual words are spilled on the stack, but this
data would be stored in memory anyway if we used arrays.
Another advantageof the EEA is that we have good control on the bit lengths of the
intermediatevariables.We can thereforesplit the main loopin severalcopies depending
on the sizes of the operands, with n sections of code for inputs of n words. These
sections are written to avoid operations between registers which are known to be zero
(for example, with the most signiﬁcant words of some variables). At the same time we
can reduce the local usage of registers, allowing an increase in the size of the inputs
before the compiler has to produce code that spills some information to memory. GCC
4.0 has decent register coloring algorithms and analysis of the code showed very good
reuse of registers across different blocks of code. See Subsection 3.6 for the impact of
this approach on performance on RISC architectures.
A limited number of registers disadvantages inversion, but a slow memory bus is
not a big problem on RISC architectures: since all the inputs can be stored in internal
registers,mostofthecomputationstakeplacewithoutmemoryaccesses.Incomparison,
a slow memorybus penalizes the multiplication muchmore than register paucity.These
facts are reﬂected in the low inversion to multiplication (I/M) ratio (often between 4
and 6) on the Powerpc G4 (slow memory interface), with an increase of this ratio to
about 10 on Powerpc G5 (many registers, but also a fast bus, which advantages the
multiplication) or even 12 on a Pentium 3 or Athlon k6 CPU (very few registers, slow
bus). On the Pentium 4 because of a slower shift operationthe inversiontends to be less
efﬁcient (the I/M ratio can in some cases exceed 20).
143.5 Modular reduction
For modular reduction we implemented two sets of routines.
The generic routine reduces arbitrary polynomials over F 2 modulo arbitrary poly-
nomials over F2. This code is in fact rather efﬁcient, and a reduction by means of this
routine can often take less than 20% of the time of a multiplication. The approach is
similar to the one taken in SUN’s contributions to OpenSSL or in NTL’s code base, and
exploits a compact representation of the reduction polynomial. The reduction polyno-
mial is given as a decreasing sequence of integers (n0,n1,n2,...,nk−1) and it is equal
to ∑
k−1
i=0 tni. Whenever possible we use a trinomial (k = 3), otherwise we use a pen-
tanomial (k = 5). Only in very few cases an eptanomial is used when its reduction is
more efﬁcient than that of the most efﬁcient pentanomial.
The second set of routines uses ﬁxed reduction polynomials, and is therefore spe-
ciﬁc for each polynomial degree. The code is very compact and streamlined. In this
situation we sometimes prefer reduction eptanomials to pentanomials when the re-
duction code is shorter due to the form of the polynomial. For example, for degree
59 we have two good irreducible polynomials: f1(t)=t59 +( t +1)(t5 +t3 +1) and
f2(t)=t59+t7+t4+t2+1.
The C code takes a polynomial of degree up to 116 (= 2·58) stored in variables r3
(most signiﬁcant word), r2, r1 and r0 (least signiﬁcant word), and reduces it modulo
f1(t), leaving the result in r1 and r0
#define bf_mod_59_6_5_4_3_1_0(r3,r2,r1,r0) do { \
r3 = ((r3) << 5) ^ ((r3) << 6); r1 ^= (r3) ^ ((r3) << 3) ^ ((r3) << 5); \
r3 = ((r2) << 5) ^ ((r2) << 6); r0 ^= (r3) ^ ((r3) << 3) ^ ((r3) << 5); \
r3 = ((r2) >> 22) ^ ((r2) >> 21); r1 ^= (r3) ^ ((r3) >> 2) ^ ((r3) >> 5); \
r2 = (r1) >> 27; r2 ^= (r2) << 1; \
r1 &= 0x07ffffff; r0 ^= (r2) ^ ((r2) << 3) ^ ((r2) << 5); \
} while (0)
and the C code to reduce the same input modulo f2(t) is
#define bf_mod_59_7_4_2_0(r3,r2,r1,r0) do { \
r1 ^= ((r3) << 5) ^ ((r3) << 7) ^ ((r3) << 9) ^ ((r3) << 12); \
r2 ^= ((r3) >> 25) ^ ((r3) >> 23) ^ ((r3) >> 20); \
r0 ^= ((r2) << 5) ^ ((r2) << 7) ^ ((r2) << 9) ^ ((r2) << 12); \
r1 ^= ((r2) >> 27) ^ ((r2) >> 25) ^ ((r2) >> 23) ^ ((r2) >> 20); \
r2 = (r1) >> 27; r1 &= 0x07ffffff; \
r0 ^= (r2) ^ ((r2) << 2) ^ ((r2) << 4) ^ ((r2) << 7); \
} while (0)
Comparing the two codes, we ﬁnd that the ﬁrst one is slightly more efﬁcient. A
similarchoiceoccursat degree107(theirreduciblepolynomialist 107+(t6+t2+1)(t+
1)), and the idea of factoringthe “lower degreepart” of the reductionpolynomialis also
used for degree 109 (the polynomial is t 109+(t6+1)(t+1)).
These considerationshave been applied to degrees 43, 53, 59, 67, 71, 73, 79, 83, 89,
101, 107, 109, 127, 137, 139, 157, 179, 199, 211, 239, 251, and 269 (which are used in
the tests) as well as the intermediate values 97, 131, and 149.
By doing this, we can keep the time for the modular reductionbetween 3 and 5% of
thetime requiredfora multiplicationinthe case thereductionpolynomialis a trinomial,
and between 6 and 10% in the other cases. Reduction modulo a trinomial is about as
15twice fast as polynomial squaring (Subsection 3.3), because in the latter there are more
memory accesses.
For degrees 47, 71, 79, 89, 97, 127, 137, 159, 199, and 239 we used a trinomial. For
degrees 43, 53, 67, 73, 83, 101, 109, 131, 139, 149, 179, 211, 251, and 269 we used a
pentanomial. For degrees 59, 107, and 219 we opted for eptanomials, when they were
reducible and had a sedimentary part of lower degree than the optimal pentanomial(see
remarks above).
As operand sizes increase, the relative cost of modular reduction decreases consid-
erably and becomes in practice negligible.
3.6 Field arithmetic and its performance
Table 1, contains the timings of the fundamental operations in the ﬁelds discussed in
the previous section. These operations are: Single multiplication (Mul), squaring (Sqr),
multiplication of 2 to 5 different ﬁeld elements by a ﬁxed one (columns from Mul2
to Mul5) and inversion (Inv). The timings for multiplications (both single and sequen-
tials) and squaring include the modular reduction. We ﬁrst give the absolute times in
microseconds, and then the relative times compared to a single multiplication (with re-
duction). Figure 1 displays in a graphical way the results of the single multiplications
for the different ﬁeld sizes.
Table 1. Timings of ﬁeld operations in µsec (1.5 GHz Powerpc G4) and ratios
Absolute timings Timings relative to multiplication
Bits Mul Sqr Mul2 Mul3 Mul4 Mul5 Inv Sqr Mul2 Mul3 Mul4 Mul5 Inv
47 .087 .014 .142 .192 .243 .296 .483 .164 1.640 2.225 2.795 3.421 5.511
53 .102 .019 .169 .238 .305 .372 .517 .182 1.654 2.330 2.982 3.641 5.063
59 .120 .020 .206 .271 .332 .396 .536 .170 1.713 2.253 2.766 3.295 4.460
67 .169 .025 .299 .374 .470 .563 .832 .148 1.774 2.220 2.791 3.340 4.935
71 .188 .019 .317 .457 .555 .654 .858 .102 1.689 2.430 2.954 3.483 4.569
73 .191 .024 .326 .470 .575 .676 .868 .125 1.702 2.453 3.004 3.530 4.536
79 .193 .019 .330 .466 .567 .670 .905 .099 1.712 2.416 2.937 3.476 4.693
83 .213 .050 .387 .518 .640 .760 .922 .236 1.818 2.430 3.003 3.569 4.329
89 .254 .025 .420 .538 .667 .796 .962 .100 1.653 2.119 2.627 3.136 3.790
97 .311 .025 .455 .612 .761 .913 1.589 .081 1.462 1.967 2.445 2.933 5.105
101 .351 .057 .535 .732 .916 1.099 1.634 .164 1.526 2.088 2.613 3.135 4.661
107 .361 .059 .547 .782 .983 1.181 1.669 .162 1.513 2.162 2.720 3.267 4.618
109 .381 .029 .553 .814 1.021 1.231 1.702 .075 1.454 2.139 2.683 3.233 4.470
127 .415 .053 .674 .957 1.201 1.447 1.832 .128 1.625 2.306 2.894 3.486 4.415
131 .460 .067 .763 1.046 1.329 1.605 3.664 .147 1.659 2.275 2.890 3.489 7.968
137 .625 .062 1.084 1.485 1.907 2.325 3.733 .100 1.734 2.375 3.050 3.718 5.969
139 .635 .067 1.113 1.506 1.931 2.360 3.761 .105 1.753 2.371 3.042 3.718 5.924
149 .677 .090 1.191 1.680 2.170 2.656 3.908 .133 1.760 2.482 3.206 3.924 5.773
157 .992 .146 1.921 2.631 3.368 4.067 3.991 .147 1.937 2.654 3.397 4.101 4.025
179 1.182 .197 2.192 2.937 3.720 4.508 5.547 .166 1.855 2.484 3.147 3.814 4.693
199 1.344 .184 2.406 3.229 4.088 4.944 12.166 .137 1.790 2.403 3.042 3.679 9.053
211 1.506 .250 2.677 3.707 4.746 5.748 12.624 .166 1.777 2.462 3.152 3.817 8.383
239 1.528 .187 2.630 3.637 4.604 5.638 14.828 .122 1.722 2.381 3.014 3.691 9.706
251 1.675 .288 2.978 4.157 5.297 6.498 15.157 .172 1.778 2.482 3.163 3.879 9.050
269 2.254 .384 4.124 5.672 7.284 8.774 20.413 .213 1.831 2.519 3.234 3.896 9.158
16Fig.1. Field multiplication performance for ﬁelds of different sizes (timings in µsec). The stars
represent the multiplication timings, whereas the arc of parabola represent a routine performing
c1 ·n2 +c0 bit operations and interpolating the best performance values. The vertical lines are
spaced 32 bits from each other. Several ﬁelds which have less-than-optimal performance are
deﬁned by pentanomials and not by trinomials.
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17The timings were obtained on a 1.5 Ghz PowerPC G4 (Motorola 7447) CPU, a 32-
bits RISC architecture with 32 general purpose integer registers. This means that we
can put several intermediate operands in the registers. Note that we do not use speciﬁc
compiler directives, but we simply declare all limbs of all intermediate operands as
single word variables, and operate on them with the usual C language logic and shift
operations. The code in fact compiles correctly on any 32-bits architecture supported
by the gnu compiler collection (we used gcc 4.0.1 under Mac OS X 10.4.3).
The register abundance easily explains not only the very good performance (multi-
plications are often 30% faster than on a 2.8 Ghz Pentium 4 processor),but also the low
timings for the inversion. If the operands of the EEA all ﬁt in the registers (which was
the case for elements of up to 6 words), then the whole inversion is performed exclu-
sively in the registers, without accessing external memory except to load the inputs and
to store the ﬁnal result. The “bump” in inversionperformanceoccurs when the registers
are no longer sufﬁcient, and the compiler must store some partial data in main memory
(as conﬁrmed by analysis of the disassembly of the compiled code).
Note that the usage of trinomials and pentanomials or eptanomials is reﬂected in
the timings. The ratio Sqr/Mul is higher if a pentanomial is used because the reduction
is slower than it would have been if a trinomial of the same degree had existed. The
reduction has a small relative impact on the ﬁeld multiplication, but it makes a bigger
difference for the ﬁeld squaring (since polynomial squaring is very inexpensive).
4 Improvements in the formulæ
In this section, we describe the algorithmic methods used to improve the formulæ of
Guyot, Kaveh and Patankar (for genus three, [21]) and of Pelzl, Wollinger and Paar (for
genus four, [52,59]). We follow three main approaches:
1. Reduce the number of inversions. As inversions are usually much more costly than
other operations, it is often a good idea to combine as many of them together,
even if this means increasing the number of multiplications. This was common for
genus two and three, but it can be pushed further for genus four as is described in
Section 4.1.
2. Reduce the number of multiplications. It goes without saying that if the number
of multiplications in the explicit formulæ can be reduced, the overall performance
will improve.MostexplicitformulædothisbyintroducingKaratsubamultiplication
to compute the product of polynomials. We obtain further improvementsby select-
ing faster algorithms (Section 4.2),combiningmultiplications using Karatsuba-like
tricks (Section 4.3) and keeping products in memory if they are used again later in
the formula.
3. Combine multiplications with a repeated operand. The goal here is to make use
of the sequential multiplications. Although this does not affect the total operation
count, this approach reduced the effective cost of some (but not all) steps by more
than 30%.
Note that approaches2 and 3 are not always compatible.In most cases, reducingthe
number of multiplications using Karatsuba-like tricks will hinder the use of sequential
18multiplications. For example, the computation of inv(x)·(v2(x)+v1(x)) in the genus
four addition formula takes 16 multiplications using classical methods. With sequen-
tial multiplications, we still have the same number of multiplications, but the effective
cost is close to that of 11.4 normal multiplications (using estimates for sequential mul-
tiplications extrapolated from Table 1 – see subsection 4.5 for the exact equivalences
adopted). With two layers of Karatsuba multiplications, we can do this in 9 multiplica-
tions, but then no operandis used in more than one product so we cannot use sequential
multiplications to get any further savings.
In this example it is clear that a Karatsuba-like approach is a better choice. In many
cases however,the choiceis notalways so clear as the savingsobtainedbygivingprece-
dence to Karatsuba-like tricks or to sequential multiplications may be very close and
will vary depending on the processor and the ﬁeld size. To avoid writing a different for-
mula for each ﬁeld size, the formulæ described in this paper assume the average case.
For some ﬁeld sizes, the formula may not be completely optimal, although the saving
that could be obtained by using a ﬁeld-speciﬁc formula would be marginal at best.
4.1 Inversions
As for curves of genus three, the common case of group addition for curves of genus
four requires two reduction steps. However,
f+vt+v2
T
uT in the second reduction step (Step
8 of Algorithm 2) for genus four is not automatically monic since the leading term in
f +vt +v2
T is vT,5
2x10. For these curves, we must therefore compute the inverses of s3
(to make uT monic), r (to get s3, for the computation of vT), s 
3 (to make s  monic) and
vT,5 (to make u3 monic).
The inverses of s3, r and s 
3 can be combined in the same way it is done for curves
of genus three, but this still leaves us with two inversion to be performed. At the time
the inverses of s 
3 and s3 are obtained, only inv(x), r and s (x) have been computed.
To minimize the number of inversions, one has to express vT,5 in terms of r and the
coefﬁcients s (x) and u2(x).
To improve readability, we use the coefﬁcients of the polynomials uT(x), z(x)=
˜ s(x)u1(x), s(x)=1
rs (x) and ˜ s(x)= 1
s 
3
s (x), eventhoughthosepolynomialsarenotcom-
puted before the inverses. Since vT(x)=s3z(x)+v1(x)+1 mod uT(x),w eh a v e
vT,5 = s3(z5+uT,4+uT,5(z6+uT,5)) .
Furthermore, replacing ˜ s(x)2u1(x) by ˜ s(x)z(x) in the equation for uT(x),w eh a v e
uT(x)=
 
˜ s(x)z(x)
u2(x)
 
+s−2
3 (x+a3+b3) ,
so uT,5 = z6+ ˜ s2+b3 and uT,4 = z5+ ˜ s2z6+ ˜ s1+b2+uT,5b3. Substituting back into the
equation of vT,5, we get
vT,5 = s3(˜ s2z6+ ˜ s1+b2+uT,5b3+uT,5(z6+uT,5))
= s3(˜ s2z6+ ˜ s1+b2+uT,5˜ s2)
= s3(˜ s2z6+ ˜ s1+b2+(z6+ ˜ s2+b3)˜ s2)
= s3
 
˜ s1+b2+ ˜ s2
2+b3˜ s2
 
.
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vT,5 =
s 
3
r
 
s 
1
s 
3
+b2+
 
s 
2
s 
3
 2
+b3
s 
2
s 
3
 
=
1
rs 
3
 
s 
2
2+s 
3(s 
1+b3s 
2+b2s 
3)
 
.
Since 1/rs 
3 is not yet known, we replace the computationof vT,5 by the computation of
rs 
3vT,5 = s 
2
2+s 
3(s 
1+b3s 
2+b2s 
3) .
To obtain the inverses of s3, r, s 
3 and vT,5,w eﬁrst compute rs 
3 and rs 
3vT,5, and let
t =
1
(rs 
3)·(rs 
3vT,5)
.
Then, the inverses of vT,5 and rs 
3 are obtained as
t ·(rs 
3)2 =
1
vT,5
and t ·(rs 
3vT,5)=
1
rs 
3
.
The inverses of s3, r and s 
3 are then obtained as before. In this manner, it is possible
to combine the ﬁnal inversion with the previous ones, at the cost of an extra ﬁve mul-
tiplications and two squarings. Note that the computation of vT,5 (which is needed for
the ﬁnal step) can then be done in one multiplication instead of two and that we no
longer need to compute z5 (which saves one more multiplication). This approach re-
duces computation time if an inversion costs more than three multiplications and two
squarings.
For the doubling formula, the approach must be modiﬁed slightly since in this case
uC(x) and vC(x) are computed directly. This time, we need the inverses of vC,7 and vT,5
and we have
vC,7vT,5 = vC,6
2+vC,5vC,7+uC,6(vC,7
2) .
We then compute
t =
1
vC,7(vC,7vT,5)
and the inverses of vT,5 and vC,7 are found as
t ·(vC,7
2)=
1
vT,5
and t ·(vC,7vT,5)=
1
vC,7
.
The second inverse is then replaced by ﬁve multiplications and two squarings, of which
one (vC,6
2) is used again at a later step. Since two of these multiplications can be com-
bined, the exchange is advantageous if one inversion cost more than (roughly)4.7 mul-
tiplications and one squaring. This trade-off is slightly to our disadvantage on the Pow-
erPC G4 (by about 0.2 multiplications on average for the ﬁelds used for genus four
testing), but we still opted to implement it as it always produces signiﬁcant savings in
other processors.
204.2 Almost inverse
One ofthe most costly step of explicitformulæis the computationofthe almost inverse.
Most of the explicit formulæ published so far [24,47,40,31,51,50,52,21,34,33] ﬁnd
the almost inverse via the computation of a resultant, however this approach is not
optimal. For every genus bigger than two, the almost inverse can be computed with
fewer ﬁeld multiplications using Cramer’s rule (for genus two, the cost are the same if
both methods are implemented carefully). This approach has the added bonus of taking
full advantage of sequential multiplications, making it even more efﬁcient.
Cramer’s rule computes a solution v to the system Mv = w where M is an n×n
matrix. The solution is
v =
1
|M|





|Sub0(M,w)|
|Sub1(M,w)|
. . .
|Subn−1(M,w)|





where Subi(M,w) is matrix M with the ith column replaced by w.
To apply this method to computing the inverse of polynomials, we need a map
between polynomials (of degree smaller then n) and vectors. To the coefﬁcient of x i in
the polynomial p(x), we associate the ith coordinate of the vector p (and vice versa).
To compute the inverse of a(x) modulo b(x), we use the matrix M where the i th row
corresponds to xia(x) mod b(x). We then solve for the vector w = 1 =( 1,0,0,...,0)t
(the constant polynomial 1). Since the matrices have many coefﬁcients in common,
most of the computations can be combined using a bottom-to-top approach (see Ap-
pendix A for details).
As we do not require the inverse, but rather an almost inverse (the product of the
inverse by a constant multiple r), we compute all the determinants used in Cramer’s
rule, but we avoid the division by |M|. We obtain:
inv =





|Sub0(M,1)|
|Sub1(M,1)|
. . .
|Subn−1(M,1)|





and r = |M| =
n−1
∑
i=0
M0,i|Subi(M,1)| .
Note that in the formulæ, the computation of r is done with some of the computations
for s (x) in order to combine some of the multiplications into pairs (and use sequential
multiplications).
4.3 Polynomial divisions
Although Karatsuba-like multiplications are most commonly applied to polynomial
multiplication, they can also be used when dealing with polynomial divisions (both
for the quotient and the remainder). We consider three main cases: The reduction of
inv(x)(v2(x)+v1(x)) modulou2(x)(computationofs (x)),thedivisionon(˜ s(x)2)·u1(x)
by u2(x) (computationof uT(x)), and the reductionof vT(x)+h(x) modulo u3(x) (com-
putation of v3(x)).
21Forthe computationof s (x), let us assume that the productinv(x)·(v2(x)+v1(x)) is
already computed (even though the product is intermingled with the reduction modulo
u2(x) in practice) and let us call it
p(x)=p6x6+ p5x5+ p4x4+ p3x3+ p2x2+ p1x+ p0 .
We want to reduce p(x) modulo u2(x), i.e. we want to write p(x)=λ(x)u2(x)+s (x)
with λ(x)=λ2x2 +λ1x+λ0. Note that although we do not really want λ(x), its com-
putation is necessary to the efﬁcient computation of s (x). The computations take the
form:
λ2 = p6
λ1 = p5+b3λ2
λ0 = p4+b3λ1+b2λ2
s 
3 = p3+b3λ0+b2λ1+b1λ2
s 
2 = p2+b2λ0+b1λ1+b0λ2
s 
1 = p1+b1λ0+b0λ1
s 
0 = p0+b0λ0 .
One important thing to notice is that although the coefﬁcients of s (x) cannot be com-
puted beforeλ0, there is no problem(other than memoryrequirements)with computing
some of the products containing λ1 or λ2 before computing λ0. The maximum num-
ber of multiplications that can be saved using a Karatsuba-like approach is three. One
can combine the pairs of multiplications in the sums b3λ1 +b2λ2, b3λ0 +b1λ2 and
b2λ0+b1λ1 (where λ0 is obtained before the last two pairs are handled). The result is 6
products with no terms in common and 3 multiplications by b0 (handled sequentially),
for an effective cost of around 8.3 multiplications. Note that in this case, using 3 se-
quential multiplications (by λ2, λ1 and λ0) on the original set of operations would have
had an effective cost of around 8.45 multiplications. (Again, see subsection 4.5 for the
equivalences.)
For the computation of uT(x), most of the work involves computing the quotient of
(˜ s(x)2·u1(x)) divided by u2(x). Since u2(x) has degree 4, the coefﬁcients of xi for i <4
in ˜ s(x)2 ·u1(x) do not have to be computed as they have no impact on the result. This
time, we assume that we have already computed
p(x)=˜ s(x)2·u1(x)=x10+ p9x9+ p8x8+ p7x7+ p6x6+ p5x5+ p4x4+...
(with p9 = a3) and we see that the coefﬁcients of uT(x) are:
uT,5 = a3+b3
uT,4 = p8+b2+b3uT,5
uT,3 = p7+b1+b3uT,4+b2uT,5
uT,2 = p6+b0+b3uT,3+b2uT,4+b1uT,5
uT,1 = p5+b3uT,2+b2uT,3+b1uT,4+b0uT,5
uT,0 = p4+b3uT,1+b2uT,2+b1uT,3+b0uT,4 .
22However, the products of b3, b2, b1 and b0 by uT,5 =( a3+b3) are already known from
thecomputationofthealmostinverse(usingCramer’srule),soweonlyneedtocompute
products of the form
uT,3 = sum3+b3uT,4
uT,2 = sum2+b3uT,3+b2uT,4
uT,1 = sum1+b3uT,2+b2uT,3+b1uT,4
uT,0 = sum0+b3uT,1+b2uT,2+b1uT,3+b0uT,4 .
After a few checks, one might be tempted to conclude that the most that can be saved
using Karatsuba-like tricks in this situation is one multiplication, but in fact it is not the
case. Although only three combinations (b3uT,3 +b2uT,4, b3uT,2+b2uT,3 and b2uT,3+
b1uT,4) could be used without requiringextra products (and no two of these can be used
successfully at the same time), it is possible to reduce the operation count by adding
one new product.If onealso computesb1uT,2, then it becomespossible to add two more
combinations(b3uT,2+b1uT,4 and b2uT,2+b1uT,3)t ob3uT,3+b2uT,4, in effectreducing
the number of multiplication by two instead of one. Once again, it is slightly more
efﬁcient to use sequential multiplications after reducing the number of multiplications
as much as possible than using them on the original equations.
Let us now consider the ﬁnal step of the the genus four formulæ (that step is es-
sentially identical for both the addition and the doubling) where we compute v 3(x)=
vT(x)+1 mod u3(x).W eh a v e
t = vT,4+e3vT,5
ε3 = vT,3+e2vT,5+e3t
ε2 = vT,2+e1vT,5+e2t
ε1 = vT,1+e0vT,5+e1t
ε0 = vT,0+1+e0t
which, at ﬁrst glance, requires 8 multiplications. Although the use of Karatsuba multi-
plications (combining e2vT,5 +e3t and e0vT,5 +e1t) reduces the number of multiplica-
tions by 2 whereas the use of sequential multiplications reduces the cost to around 5.7
multiplications, the Karatsuba approach is in fact better. The idea here is to reorder the
6 products into three pairs:
– e3vT,5 and e1vT,5 (done ﬁrst, so t can be computed)
– e2t and e0t
– (e3+e2)(vT,5 +t) and (e1+e0)(vT,5+t) to obtain the two sets of combined prod-
ucts).
By computing these pairs as sequential multiplications, we can get the effective cost
down to around 5.1 multiplications.
For the genus four addition, there are three remaining cases that we do not discuss
where a Karatsuba-like approach can be considered:
– The computation of z(x)=˜ s(x)·u1(x). The pattern of multiplications encountered
are the same as for the reductionof inv(x)(v2(x)+v1(x)) modulo u2(x), but viewed
upside down since z5 is not required (see Section 4.1).
23– The computation of (˜ s(x)2)·u1(x) (before the division by u2(x)). Since only the
coefﬁcients of powers of x greater than 4 are needed and ˜ s(x)2 only contains even
powers of x, it is not possible to obtain any saving from this approach.
– The computation of u3(x). Here we have only one possible way of reducing multi-
plications, by combining the products in e3uT,4+e2uT,5.
4.4 Variables
A veryseriousissue withthe genusfourformulæ(and,toa lesser extent,thegenusthree
formulæ as well), is the number of variables involved. An implementation of the addi-
tion operation for genus four that does not worry about memory requirements would
use 234 variables (240 to take into account the “sequential” form of our implementa-
tion of sequential multiplications). This number of variables is obviously too large for
constrained environments, and even with two or three words per ﬁeld elements (as is
the case for the security levels considered in this paper), this would mean a storage in
the order of one kilobyte for the variables alone. At this point, the memory allocation
might affect the performance of the computations also for high-end processors: even if
this memory is allocated statically, its use may still take up a non-negligible part of the
level 1 cache of the processor.
The natural solution is to use the same variables multiple times. We decided to
minimize the number of variables as much as possible without losing any (signiﬁcant)
efﬁciency in exchange. The result is a more compact and portable code which can be
used even in constrained environments. To minimize memory allocations as much as
possible, we chose to deﬁne an array of ﬁeld elements, whose address is passed as part
of the function calls for the addition and doublingand where all the intermediateresults
of the group operations are stored.
To improve readability, the formulæ in the appendix are given in terms of distinct
variables and they are accompanied by an allocation schedule for the variable array.
In a few cases, a variable is copied into a different location in the array to obtain an
adjacent sequence that can be used for the sequential multiplications (this is due to our
choice for the functioncall), or a long sum is brokeninto two shorter sums to free some
of the variables. The ﬁnal values are kept with the other variables until the last minute
(at which point they are copied into the space allocated to a divisor) so the function’s
output can replace one of its inputs if desired.
The resulting formulæ require 14 variables for the genus three addition and dou-
bling,19 forthe genusfourdoublingand23 for the addition.In all cases, these numbers
are minimal with the present formulæ as there are “bottlenecks” where all the variables
are either in use for the current operation or contain values that were computed earlier
and will be used later.
4.5 Operation counts
The addition and doubling formulæ for genus three, with the tables of variable alloca-
tion, are in Appendix B, and those for genus four are in Appendix C. Tables 2 and 3
compare the operation counts of our formulæ with previous works (note that for the
24genus four addition, changing from h = x to h = 1 only affects the number of ﬁeld ad-
ditions, the difference in operation counts comes from our improvements). We give to
sets of numbers for our formulæ: One where sequential multiplications are handled as
normal multiplication (the “classical” coost) and one where they are done sequentially
as in Subsection 3.2 (the “effective” cost). To obtain the effective cost, we use an aver-
age value from Table 1 (over the ﬁelds of 47 to 101 bits), with pairs of multiplications
costing 1.7 single multiplication, sequences of 3 costing 2.3, sequences of 4 costing
2.85, and sequences of 5 costing 3.4. For Cantor’s and Nagao’s algorithms, we use the
odd characteristicnumbers as an indicator of the cost in characteristic two (the numbers
that would be obtained by adapting these algorithms to even characteristic should differ
only slightly).
Table 2. Field operation counts for genus three group operations
Reference Characteristic Curve properties Addition Doubling
Cantor [8] odd h = 0 4 I + 200 M/S 4 I + 207 M/S
Nagao [47] odd h = 0 2 I + 144 M/S 2 I + 153 M/S
Pelzl et al. [50] two h = 1, f6 = 0 1I+6 5M+6S 1I+1 4M+1 1S
Guyot et al. [21] two h = 1, f6 = 0 1I+5 8M+6S 1I+1 1M+1 1S
this work, classical two h = 1, f6 = 0 1I+5 7M+6S 1I+1 1M+1 1S
this work, effective two h = 1, f6 = 0 1I+4 7 . 7M+6S1I+9 . 3M+1 1S
Table 3. Field operation counts for genus four group operations
Reference Characteristic Curve properties Addition Doubling
Cantor [8] odd h = 0 6 I + 386 M/S 6 I + 359 M/S
Nagao [47] odd h = 0 2 I + 289 M/S 2 I + 268 M/S
Pelzl et al. [52] two h = x, f8 = 0 2I+1 4 8M+6S 2I+7 5M+1 4S
this work, classical two h = 1, f8 = 0, f7  = 0 1I+1 1 9M+1 0S 1I+2 8M+1 6S
this work, effective two h = 1, f8 = 0, f7  = 0 1 I + 98.15 M + 10 S 1 I + 23.7 M + 16 S
5 Security
In this section, we describe how the different security levels are selected, as well as the
security of the form of curve used.
For curves of genus one and two, the fastest known attack is Pollard’s Rho algo-
rithm which take O(
√
group order) group operations. Since the group order of a curve
of genus g over a ﬁeld of q elements is qg +O(gqg−1/2), this means O(
√
q1) group
25operations for elliptic curves over the ﬁeld Fq1 and O(q2) group operations for curves
of genus two over the ﬁeld Fq2.
For curves of genus three and four, the fastest known attack is the index calcu-
lus algorithm. Using the double large prime variations of Gaudry, Thom´ e, Th´ eriault
and Diem [20] and Nagao [48], and ignoring logarithmic terms, this attack requires
O(q2−2/g) group operations for a genus g over of ﬁeld of q elements. For a curve of
genus three over Fq3, this means O(q3
4/3) group operations, and for a curve of genus
four over Fq4, this means O(q4
3/2) group operations.
To obtain a precise comparison of the security levels, we would need to take into
account any logarithmic term present in the index calculus running time, as well as
the underlying constants in both algorithms. To simplify the analysis, we assume no
logarithmic term and identical constants. This assumption should in fact disadvantage
slightly the curves of genus three and four: The constants are most likely of similar
size, while proven results on the double large prime index calculus contain an extra
logarithmic factor, so we are underestimating the cost for genus three and four.
For the discrete log to require the same amount on each curve, we need
1
2
log(q1) ≈ log(q2) ≈
4
3
log(q3) ≈
3
2
log(q4) ,
where qg is the order of the ﬁeld of deﬁnition for the curve of genus g. To comparewith
an EC over a ﬁeld of n bits, we need a ﬁeld of n/2 bits for genus two, 3n/8 bits for
genus three and n/3 bits for genus four.
Since Pollard Rho can be adapted to take advantage of the existence of subgroups
or knowledge of the key size, curves of genus one and two are assumed to groups of
order twice a prime (the form of the curves forces the grouporder to be even) with keys
of n bits.
Forgenus three andfour,the situation is differentsince the indexcalculus algorithm
works on the algebraic group as a whole, so it cannot take advantage of the existence
of subgroups or any information on the key (including the bit size). On the other hand,
Pollard Rho could still be used if the subgroups were small enough or if the keys were
short enough, so to have an equivalent security the curves must have a prime-ordered
subgroup of at least n bits. Similarly, the keys used must also be at least n bits long, but
keys of more than n bits do not give any added security since they are attacked using
index calculus.
The last remark is very important from an efﬁciency point of view, since it means
that the same key (scalar) can be used for all four genera instead of having to increase
the key length for genus three and four. The (sub)group sizes are also of interest, since
curves of genus three could allow a cofactor of up to n/8 bits and curves of genus four
could have a cofactor of n/4 bits (the group orders have 9n/8 and 4n/3 bits respec-
tively), which could make the search for a “good” curve much easier.
A ﬁnal concern in the choice of the ﬁeld is the Weil descent attack, which is a
risk for some ﬁeld extensions (see [19] for EC, [58] for HEC). Although these attacks
may not always be a risk for every curve over a given ﬁeld extension, recent develop-
ments [25,42] show that for some extension degrees a large proportion of curves are at
risk. Gaudry [18] also showed that small factors in the extension degree can expose all
26curves deﬁned over that ﬁeld to a Weil descent-like attack. However, no known varia-
tion exists for prime extensions, so we avoid the issue of “how likely is a Weil descent
to work on a given ﬁeld?”, by choosing all ﬁelds of the form F2p, where p is a prime.
The only security aspect that remains to be discussed is the form of the deﬁning
equation of the curves. For genus one and two, curves of the form y 2 +y = f(x) are
supersingular and are exposed to the MOV [41] or Frey-R¨ uck [16] attack and their
hyperelliptic variant [17] (all of which can be subsumed under the treatment of Tate-
Lichtenbaum pairings) and, hence, they should be avoided for designing DL systems.
Hence we selected curves of the form y2+xy = f(x) for security and efﬁciency. As we
choose curves of the form y2 +y = f(x) for genus three and four, it is natural to ask
whether they are supersingularor not. Using results of Scholten and Zhu [55], we know
that none of the curves of genus three over binary ﬁelds are supersingular, while the
only supersingular curves of genus four over binary ﬁelds are of the (simpliﬁed) form
y2+y = x9+ f5x5+ f3x3+ f1x+ f0. We can then safely use the special form for curves
of genus three, and the only condition required for genus four is to insure that f 7  = 0,
which is easily veriﬁed.
6 Timings and comparisons
In Table 4 we show the timings of our implementation of EC and of HEC jacobians of
genus up to four. Since our goal is to make a comparison between the performance of
curves of differentgenera offeringthe same security level, we attemptedto ﬁnd quadru-
plets of degrees of ﬁeld extensions (p1,p2,p3,p4) where p2 ≈ p1/2, p3 ≈ 3p1/8, and
p4 ≈ p1/3 (see Section 5), and used randomly chosen curves of genus i over F pi for
i = 1,2,3, and 4. We admitted tolerances of at most 2% (in bits) of security level be-
tween the “most” and the “least” secure curves in each quadruplet. Due to the highly
irregular distribution of primes, we could not ﬁnd neat matches for all security levels,
but we could ﬁnd 9 good sets, from low-cost security (roughly 140 bits), to high secu-
rity (270 bits). In four of these sets some curves are missing, but we included them to
offer a broad range of cases.
For each curve and security level we report the timings for doubling of a point
(DBL) and addition of two different points on the curve (ADD), then scalar multiplica-
tion timings using the non-adjacentform (NAF) and a signed windowing method based
on the NAFw. We also compare the timings of our implementations using sequential
multiplications (cfr. Section 3.2) and without using sequential multiplications (i.e. each
sequential multiplication is replaced by several multiplication).
We did not devise and implement projective coordinates for curves of genus greater
than one. We either looked at the formulæ currently available in literature, or estimated
the number of multiplications that such formulæ would require, and veriﬁed that in our
situation (with relatively low inversion to multiplication ratios) projective coordinates
would not give a performance gain. For EC the situation is slightly different. We show
timings for both operations in afﬁne coordinates and mixed afﬁne/L´ opez-Dahab coor-
dinates (also using a mixed coordinate approach to reduce some of the precomputation
costs of the NAFw scalar multiplication).
27In Figure2 we show the best timings foreach curvetype and securitylevel, whereas
in Figure 3 the timings of curves of genus at least two are normalized with respect to
EC performance.
It is immediate that the performance of curves of genus four is comparable to that
of EC, and is often better. Curves of genus two and three have similar performance,
with genus three winning in some cases despite the use of the Lange-Stevens doubling
(the genus two addition formula also proﬁts from the use of sequential multiplication)
and both perform better than curves of genus one and four.
This result is obtained by using sequential multiplications. The gain (as seen by
Table 4)is oftenaround15%for curves of genusthree with regardto animplementation
that does not use sequential multiplications. For genus four, this gain approaches 20%.
Because of the nature of the arithmetic, there are no gains for EC in afﬁne coordinates
and a very small gain using L´ opez-Dahab coordinates (less than 1%.) For curves of
genus two the improvement is around 2%.
It may be interesting to compare our results to those obtained by Pelzl, Wollinger,
and Paar in [59] and [52]. We collected some of their timings in Table 5, and grouped
them according to our security level criteria to ease comparison with ours. The proces-
sor used in these papers is a 1.8 Ghz Pentium 4. In our tests, such a machine is usually
slightly slowerthan our1.5GhzPowerpcG4 onmultiplication,and signiﬁcantlyslower
in the inversion (with an inversion to multiplication ratio between 9 and 12). In fact, for
the ﬁeld F247 they measure 3.752 µsec for an inversion and 0.407 µsec for a multipli-
cation, giving a ratio of 9.33, whereas for the same ﬁeld we have 0.483 µsec for an
inversion, 0.087 µsec for a multiplication, and a ratio of 5.511 (cf. Figure 1).
On their architecture, the fastest coordinate system for EC is therefore one of the
projective systems, and the disparity between point addition and doubling in their tim-
ings seems to conﬁrm that they used such a coordinate system (although they do not
give information about this). For higher genera they use afﬁne coordinates, just as we
do. They also seem to use a windowing scalar multiplication method. On the security
side, they do not hesitate to use non-prime extension ﬁelds, generating curves which
are possibly weaker because of Weil descent attacks (see Section 5). We note that their
arithmetic is faster on F263 than on F259, suggesting that fast ﬁeld arithmetic techniques
were used for ﬁelds of non-prime extension, for instance to speed-up inversions, thus
skewing the comparison of performance at given security levels in an unfair way to-
wards potentially weaker ﬁelds. They do not employ optimizations depending on ﬁeld
size (except when the extension degree is composite), nor serial multiplication tech-
niques, and do not restrict keysizes.
A comparison of the results must then be viewed with some care, but our results
show a clear improvement in the performance. This is already signiﬁcant for genus 2
and 3 where in [59,52] the performance roughly matches that of elliptic curves, while
we show signiﬁcant gains. Their results for genus 4 would suggest that the performance
of such curves makes them unsuitable for practical applications,with a increase in costs
by a factor of close to 4, but our results show similar performanceto EC. A comparison
of the two architectures and of the EC results clearly shows that our EC implementation
was given at least as much care as theirs.
28The disparity in the timings for smaller ﬁelds also reﬂects that we have been able
to efﬁciently remove the overheads in the software implementation, thus reducing the
penalities suffered by curves of higher genus.
To put things in a broader perspective, Table 6 gives timings for other implemen-
tations over ﬁelds of even characteristic. Computer architectures evolve very quickly
and, as we already mentioned, not all operations become faster at the same rate (the
discussion about inversion speed on the PowerPC G4 and Pentium 4 architectures is
just one of many examples). However, we can try to compare results to show the evo-
lution of implementation performance. Roughly speaking, the computer used in [30]
is between 20 and 25 times slower than our reference architecture (1.5 GHz Powerpc
G4), the computer in [53] about 3 to 4 times slower, the one used in [54] 2 to 3 times
slower, and the machine employed in [32] is at least 30% slower. It should be noted
that [53] and [54] use 64-bits processors, so the ﬁelds of 41 and 59 bits require only
single-register arithmetic, which may explain the sharp increase in timings when the
ﬁeld size increases to 89 and 113 bits for the curves of genus 3.
The timings show an improvement by a factor close to 60 in scalar multiplication
performanceon a curve of genusthree over a binaryﬁeld of 59 bits from [54] to our im-
plementation, which amounts to a factor between 15 and 20 once the processor speeds
or the choices of scalar (including the use of a NAF) are taken into account. This in-
crease in performance is due to the use of highly optimised explicit formulæ in place of
Cantor’s algorithm. A comparison with [59] (see Table 5) suggests that our improved
formulæ andﬁeldarithmetic implementationsare responsiblefor aspeed-upbya factor
in the order of 5 to 8.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we reconsidered the issue of implementing low genus hyperelliptic Jaco-
bian arithmetic over ﬁelds of even characteristic. Instead of independently addressing
ﬁeld arithmetic, the derivation of explicit formulæ, and the impact of recent security
research, we studied the interplay of these issues.
Our work starts in Section 2 with a thorough reconsideration of the methodology
used to derive explicit formulæ from Cantor’s algorithm. In fact, the paper at hand
contains the ﬁrst comprehensive discussion of the techniques involved, at least for the
case ofafﬁnecoordinates.Inparticularwecollectanddiscussideas previouslyscattered
in a lot of different papers, including, for example [47], [24], and [32].
In Section 3 we moved to the issues surrounding efﬁcient implementation of ﬁnite
ﬁelds of characteristic two and of prime extension degree. Even though some of the
implementation techniques were already known, we pushed them as much as possible
in order to reduce the performance penalties associated to architecture granularity. The
results, while offering very good performance, show also a behaviour very close to the
theoretical bit-complexity for a wide range of ﬁelds.
When explicit formulæ are designed, it is customary to speed-up polynomial oper-
ations by means of Karatsuba-like tricks. We found that using sequential multiplication
routines (also described in Section 3) in combination with these Karatsuba-like tricks
29Table 4. Scalar multiplication timings in µsec (1.5 GHz Powerpc G4)
Sec. Using sequential mults No sequential mults
lvl.
Curve
DBL ADD NAF NAFw DBL ADD NAF NAFw
ec(139) A 6.20 6.21 1151 1029 6.20 6.21 1151 1029
A/LD 4.83 7.59 1033 893 4.83 7.78 1048 904
140 g2(71) 2.39 5.28 577 492 2.39 5.51 588 499
g3(53) 1.93 5.89 542 446 2.06 6.59 592 486
g4(47) 3.07 10.35 906 739 3.66 12.98 1110 900
ec(157) A 6.80 6.81 1421 1267 6.80 6.81 1421 1267
A/LD 6.09 10.20 1517 1284 6.09 10.60 1539 1295
160 g2(79) 2.39 5.17 645 546 2.39 5.41 656 554
g3(59) 2.14 6.79 692 562 2.37 7.65 772 626
g4(53) 3.67 12.18 1214 980 4.28 14.81 1446 1162
ec(179) A 8.37 8.37 1994 1771 8.37 8.37 1994 1771
A/LD 7.33 12.27 2082 1756 7.33 12.47 2094 1762
180 g2(89) 2.78 6.42 880 734 2.78 6.67 895 743
g3(67) 3.00 9.97 1132 904 3.40 11.93 1320 1047
g4(59) 4.18 13.72 1567 1253 4.84 17.02 1883 1494
ec(199) A 14.34 14.38 3807 3370 14.34 14.38 3807 3370
A/LD 7.62 12.69 2410 2066 7.62 13.20 2443 2083
200 g2(101) 4.14 8.94 1417 1183 4.14 9.41 1448 1202
g3(no curve) – – – – – – – –
g4(67) 5.89 20.59 2538 1999 6.78 24.87 2998 2348
ec(211) A 15.45 15.47 4344 3838 15.45 15.47 4344 3838
A/LD 8.36 14.13 2827 2407 8.36 14.67 2865 2426
210 g2(107) 4.32 9.16 1557 1299 4.32 9.65 1592 1320
g3(79) 3.34 11.10 1484 1172 3.65 13.02 1686 1319
g4(71) 6.22 22.34 2884 2254 7.07 26.32 3342 2601
ec(no curve) – – – – – – – –
220 g2(109) 4.41 9.56 1673 1389 4.41 10.05 1708 1410
g3(83) 3.74 12.54 1743 1371 4.11 14.40 1960 1533
g4(73) 6.50 23.02 3119 2436 7.36 26.93 3594 2796
ec(239) A 17.97 17.93 5709 5025 17.97 17.93 5709 5025
A/LD 7.87 13.87 3058 2600 7.87 14.16 3081 2612
240 g2(no curve) – – – – – – – –
g3(89) 3.90 13.45 2003 1561 4.55 16.71 2429 1878
g4(79) 6.46 23.09 3398 2636 7.40 27.49 3976 3068
ec(251) A 18.90 18.90 6317 5555 18.90 18.90 6317 5555
A/LD 9.38 15.78 3758 3193 9.38 16.37 3808 3218
250 g2(127) 4.67 11.36 2115 1721 4.67 11.81 2152 1743
g3(no curve) – – – – – – – –
g4(83) 7.37 25.82 3993 3098 8.26 30.08 4571 3529
ec(269) A 24.28 24.28 8697 7635 24.28 24.28 8697 7635
A/LD 11.19 21.31 5021 4249 11.19 21.89 5079 4276
270 g2(137) 7.53 17.14 3576 2925 7.53 17.51 3610 2945
g3(101) 5.44 18.28 3116 2421 6.37 23.28 3805 2921
g4(89) 7.76 27.64 4583 3532 9.27 34.62 5618 4302
30Fig.2. Scalar multiplication performance for curves of different genera at various security levels
(timings in msec)
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Fig.3. Scalar multiplication performance for curves of genera two, three and four at various
security levels, relative to EC performance (normalized to 1.0)
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31Table 5. Timings of group operation and scalar multiplication according to Pelzl et al. [59],
except for the starred results, which are from [52] (all tests on the same 1.8 GHz Pentium 4
workstation)
Sec. ADD DBL
Scal.
Lvl.
Curve Mult.
µsec. µsec. msec.
ec(163) 18.3 9.4 2.60
g2(81) 18.7 11.7 2.73
162 g3(54) 24.8 8.9 2.56
g4(47) 53.8 30.7 8.59
g4(47)∗ 50.3 29.3 8.05
ec(179) 16.9 9.8 2.80
g2(91) 21.1 13.7 3.50
180 g3(63) 25.3 9.2 3.10
g4(59) 65.2 37.9 10.36
ec(191) 15.4 8.7 2.78
g2(95) 19.0 12.6 3.41
190 g4(63) 63.7 33.1 9.50
g4(63)∗ 51.6 29.8 8.43
Table 6. Performance of other hyperelliptic curve software implementations over binary ﬁelds.
Paper Architecture Curve Timing (msec.)
g2(64) 730
[30]
Pentium g3(42) 1200
100 Mhz g4(31) 1100
g5(25) 1800
g3(59) 83.3
[53]
Alpha 21164A g4(41) 96.6
467 Mhz g3(89) 2570
g3(113) 3790
[54]
Alpha21164A g3(59) 40
600 Mhz g4(41) 43
[32]
Pentium 4 g2(83) 18.875
1.5 Ghz g2(97) 27.188
32brings substantial performance gains, especially as the genus increases. This is one of
the key observations in Section 4, and these are reﬂected in the real world results re-
ported in Section 6. For genera three, resp. four, the gains are often close to 15%, resp.
20%. Smaller gains can be obtained even when using L´ opez-Dahab coordinates for el-
liptic curvesas well as in the afﬁnegenus two formulæ:this has been taken into account
in our comparisons. Our genus four formulæ are much better than the best ones previ-
ously published (for example, doublings costs decrease from 2I+75M+14S in [52] to
1I+28M+16S in this paper) and are further improved by the use of sequential multipli-
cations
Moreover, we restrict the computations to speciﬁc subgroups or subsets of the con-
sideredalgebraicgroupsto speedupscalarmultiplicationprovidedthereis noreduction
in security (Section 5) by doing so. This is due to the fact that index calculus methods
attack the DLP in the whole algebraic groupand do not consider subgroupsor key sizes
- whereas square root methods (such as Pollard’s methods) can be restricted to search
in subgroups or among keys of a certain size.
Some interesting results and observations stemming from the benchmarks (Sec-
tion 6) are:
– Curves of genus three provide similar performance to curves of genus two, and
perform even better in some circumstances.
If sequential multiplications can successfully be implemented in hardware, these
curves could be very interesting for hardware implementors since smaller multi-
plying units are required for genus three than for genus two.
– Cryptographicallysecure curves of genus three and four may be easier to ﬁnd since
we can allow larger cofactors than in the genus one and two cases.
– Genus four is still interesting, when used wisely, as its performance is comparable
to that of elliptic curves.
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A Almost inverse using Cramer’s rule
In this section, we describe how to compute the almost inverse in the genus four group
addition. The situation for genus three is a simple restriction of the genus four case.
To compute the almost inverse of u1(x) modulo u2(x), we apply Cramer’s rule to
the matrix M given by:
M =




M0,0 M0,1 M0,2 M0,3
M1,0 M1,1 M1,2 M1,3
M2,0 M2,1 M2,2 M2,3
M3,0 M3,1 M3,2 M3,3




where the ith column corresponds to xiu1(x) mod u2(x). To compute M, we compute
the columns inductively, starting from the left (u1(x) mod u2(x)), multiplying by x and
reducing modulo u2(x) at each step:
M =




a0+b0 M0,3·b0 M1,3·b0 M2,3·b0
a1+b1 M0,0+M0,3·b1 M1,0+M1,3·b1 M2,0+M2,3·b1
a2+b2 M0,1+M0,3·b2 M1,1+M1,3·b2 M2,1+M2,3·b2
a3+b3 M0,2+M0,3·b3 M1,2+M1,3·b3 M2,2+M2,3·b3




Note that the productsin the computationof the secondcolumnappearagainat the later
step of the group addition (see Subsection 4.3).
In Subsection 4.2, we showed that obtaining r = det(M) is straightforward once
inv0, inv1, inv2 and inv3 are computed, and these can be written as:
inv0 = det


M1,1 M1,2 M1,3
M2,1 M2,2 M2,3
M3,1 M3,2 M3,3

 , inv1 = det


M1,0 M1,2 M1,3
M2,0 M2,2 M2,3
M3,0 M3,2 M3,3

 ,
inv2 = det


M1,0 M1,1 M1,3
M2,0 M2,1 M2,3
M3,0 M3,1 M3,3

 , inv3 = det


M1,0 M1,1 M1,2
M2,0 M2,1 M2,2
M3,0 M3,1 M3,2

 .
36Wecomputethesefourdeterminantsusingtheschoolbookinductiveapproach,start-
ing from the top row of each matrix. Since all four matrices are in fact submatrices of
M, each 2×2 determinant of square submatrices coming from the two lower rows of M
appear in two of these computations, but they only need to be computed once each. We
write the 2×2 determinants as:
α0,1 = det
 
M2,0 M2,1
M3,0 M3,1
 
, α0,2 = det
 
M2,0 M2,2
M3,0 M3,2
 
,
α0,3 = det
 
M2,0 M2,3
M3,0 M3,3
 
, α1,2 = det
 
M2,1 | M2,2
M3,1 M3,2
 
,
α1,3 = det
 
M2,1 M2,3
M3,1 M3,3
 
, α2,3 = det
 
M2,2 M2,3
M3,2 M3,3
 
.
The algorithm can now be written simply in terms of multiplications: We ﬁrst com-
pute
αi,j = M2,i·M3,j +M2,j·M3,i
for 0 ≤ i < j ≤ 3, then
invi =∑
j =i
αk1,k2 ·M1,j
for 0 ≤ i ≤ 3 (where {k1,k2} is the ordered set given by {0,1,2,3}\{i, j}), and ﬁnaly
r = inv0·M0,0+inv1·M0,1+inv2·M0,2+inv3·M0,3 .
These computations require a total of 40 multiplications: 12 to compute M, 12 for
the αi,j’s, 12 for the invi’s and 4 for r. The regular structure of these multiplications
makes them very convenient to do in combination with sequential multiplications, giv-
ing 11 blocks of products (3 to compute M and 4 each for the α i,j’s and the invi’s),
leaving only the products in the computation of r as single multiplications. These 4
remaining products are then combined into pairs of multiplications with some of the
products required for the computations of s (x).
37B Genus three formulæ
Addition formula D3 = D1⊕D2
Inputs:
D1 =[ u1(x),v1(x)], u1(x)=a0+a1x+a2x2+x3 and v1(x)=c0+c1x+c2x2
D2 =[ u2(x),v2(x)], u2(x)=b0+b1x+b2x2+x3 and v2(x)=d0+d1x+d2x2
C : y2+h(x)y = f(x) with h(x)=h0 ∈ Fq and f(x)=f0+ f1x+ f2x2+ f3x3+ f4x4+ f5x5+x7
Outputs:
D3 =[ u3(x),v3(x)], u3(x)=e0+e1x+e2x2+x3 and v3(x)=ε0+ε1x+ε2x2
Step Operations Cost Effective
1 Almost inverse, inv(x)=r·u1(x)−1 mod u2(x), via Cramer’s rule, inv(x)=inv0+inv1x+inv2x2+inv3x3 12 M 9.7 M
M0,0 = b0+a0; M1,0 = b1+a1; M2,0 = b2+a2; (M0,1,T0,T1)=M2,0·(b0,b1,b2);
M1,1 = T0+M0,0; M2,1 = T1+M1,0; (M0,2,t2,t3)=M2,1·(b0,b1,b2); M1,2 =t2+M0,1;
M2,2 =t3+M1,1; (t4,t5)=M1,0·(M2,2,M2,1); (t6,t7)=M1,1·(M2,2,M2,0);
(t8,t9)=M1,2·(M2,0,M2,1); inv0 =t6+t9; inv1 =t4+t8; inv2 =t5+t7;
If r is 0 use Cantor’s algorithm
2 r = inv(x)·u1(x) mod u2(x) 6M 5.1 M
q0 = d0+c0; q1 = d1+c1; q2 = d2+c2; (t10,T11)=inv0·(M0,0,q0);
(t12,λ1)=inv2·(M0,2,q2); t13 =t12+t10; (t14,T15)=inv1·(M0,1,q1); r =t13+t14;
3 s (x)=r·s(x), where s(x)=u1(x)−1·(v2(x)+v1(x)) mod u2(x), s (x)=s 
0+s 
1x+s 
2x2 8M 7.4 M
t16 = inv0+inv1; t17 = inv0+inv2; t18 = inv1+inv2; t19 = q1+q2; t20 = q1+q0;
t21 = q0+q2; t22 =t17·t21; t23 =t18·t19; (t24,t25)=λ1·(b1,b2);
λ0 =t25+T15+λ1+t23; (t26,t27)=λ0·(b0,b2); s 
2 =t22+T11+λ1+T15+t24+t27;
s 
0 =t26+T11; t28 =t20·t16; t29 = λ0+λ1; t30 = b0+b1; t31 =t29·t30;
s 
1 =t31+s 
0+T15+t24+t28;
4 computation of inverses and ˜ s(x) (s (x) made monic), ˜ s(x)=˜ s0+ ˜ s1x+x2 1I+6M+1S 1I+5M+1S
t32 = r·s 
2
If t32 is 0 use Cantor’s algorithm
t33 = 1/t32; t34 =( s 
2)2; (t35,s2)=t33·(r,t34); (T36, ˜ s0, ˜ s1)=t35·(r,s 
0,s 
1);
5 uT(x)=
 
˜ s(x)2u1(x)
u2(x)
 
+s2
−2(x+a2+b2), uT(x)=uT,0+uT,1x+uT,2x2+uT,3x3+x4 6M+3S 5.4 M + 3 S
t37 =(˜ s0)2; t38 =(˜ s1)2; (t39,t40)=t38·(a1,a2); uT,3 = a2+b2;
uT,2 =t38+a1+b1+T1; (t41,t42)=uT,2·(b1,b2); l1 =t42+a0+b0+T0+t40;
t43 = l1·b2; l0 =t43+t37+M0,1+t39+t41; t44 =( T36)2; t45 =t44·uT,3;
uT,1 =t44+l1; uT,0 =t45+l0;
6 z(x)=˜ s(x)u1(x), z(x)=z0+z1x+z2x2+z3x3+z4x4+x5 5M 4.4 M
(t46,t47)=˜ s1·(a1,a2); (z0,t48)=˜ s0·(a0,a2); t49 = ˜ s0+ ˜ s1; t50 = a0+a1;
t47+z3 = a1+ ˜ s0; t51 =t49·t50; z2 = a0+t46+t48; z1 =t51+z0+t46;
7 vT(x)=s3z(x)+v1(x)+1 mod uT(x), vT(x)=vT,0+vT,1x+vT,2x2+vT,3x3 8M 5.7 M
t52 = ˜ s1+uT,3+a2; (t53,t54,t55,t56)=t52·(uT,0,uT,1,uT,2,uT,3); t57 =t53+z0;
t58 =t54+uT,0+z1; t59 =t55+uT,1+z2; t60 =t56+uT,2+z3;
(t61,t62,t63,vT,3)=s2·(t57,t58,t59,t60); T64 =t61+c0; vT,1 =t62+c1; vT,2 =t63+c2;
8 u3(x)=Monic
 
f(x)+vT(x)+vT(x)2
uT(x)
 
, u3(x)=e0+e1x+e2x2+x3 3M+2S 2.7 M + 2 S
t65 =( vT,3)2; t66 =( vT.2)2; e2 =t65+uT,3; (t67,t68)=e2·(uT,2,uT,3);
e1 =t68+ f5+uT,2; t69 = uT,3·e1; e0 =t66+ f4+uT,1+t67+t69;
9 v3(x)=vT(x)+1 mod u3(x), v3(x)=ε0+ε1x+ε2x2 3M 2.3 M
(t70,t71,t72)=vT,3·(e0,e1,e2); ε2 = vT,2+t72; ε1 = vT,1+t71; ε0 = T64+t70;
Total 1I+5 7M+6S1 I + 47.7 M + 6 S
38Variable schedule for the genus 3 addition formula
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
M0,0 M1,0 M2,0 M1,1 M2,1 M0,2 t2 t3 t6 t4 t5 M0,1 T0 T1
t12 t7 q1 t8 λ1 t14 M1,2 M2,2 inv0 inv1 inv2 t49 t43 t42
t13 q0 t20 q2 t32 t16 t10 t9 t17 t18 t19 t54 l0 l1
r t21 t31 t22 t34 t29 T15 T11 t27 t25 t24 t58 t50 t48
t39 t23 s 
1 s 
2 t37 t33 T36 t28 t30 λ0 t41 t66 t55 t56
t45 t26 t38 t35 t47 z0 t51 ˜ s0 ˜ s1 s2 t46 e0 t59 t60
uT,0 s 
0 uT,2 uT,3 z3 t61 z1 z2 t52 t69 t53 t68 t65
t40 t71 t72 T64 t62 t63 vT,3 t57 e1 e2
t44 ε0 vT,1 vT,2 t67
uT,1 ε1 ε2
t70
Doubling formula D3 =[ 2]D1
Inputs:
D1 =[ u1(x),v1(x)], u1(x)=a0+a1x+a2x2+x3 and v1(x)=c0+c1x+c2x2
C : y2+h(x)y = f(x) with h(x)=h0 ∈ Fq and f(x)=f0+ f1x+ f2x2+ f3x3+ f4x4+ f5x5+x7
Outputs:
D3 =[ u3(x),v3(x)], u3(x)=e0+e1x+e2x2+x3 and v3(x)=ε0+ε1x+ε2x2
Step Operations Cost Effective
1 uC(x)=u1(x)2, uC(x)=uC,0+uC,2x2+uC,4x4+x6 3S 3S
uC,0 =( a0)2; uC,2 =( a1)2; uC,4 =( a2)2;
2 vC(x)=v1(x)2+ f(x) mod uC(x), vC(x)=vC,0+vC,1x+vC,2x2+vC,3x3+vC,4x4+vC,5x5 3S 3S
t0 =( c0)2; t1 =( c1)2; t2 =( c2)2; vC,0 = f0+t0; vC,1 = f1+uC,0; vC,2 = f2+t1;
vC,3 = f3+uC,2; vC,4 = f4+t2; vC,5 = f5+uC,4;
If vC,5 is 0 use Cantor’s algorithm
3 computation of inverse 1I 1I
T3 = 1/vC,5;
4 uT(x)=Monic
 
f(x)+vC(x)+vC(x)2
uC(x)
 
, uT(x)=uT,0+uT,1x+uT,2x2+x4 5M+3S 4M+3S
uT,1 =( T3)2; t4 =( vC,4)2; t5 =( vC,3)2; (t6,t7)=uT,1·(t4,t5); uT,2 =t6+uC,4;
t8 = uC,2+t7; (t9,T10,T11)=uT,2·(uC,4,vC,5,vC,4); uT,0 =t8+t9;
5 vT(x)=vC(x)+1 mod uT(x), vT(x)=vT,0+vT,1x+vT,2x2+vT,3x3 2M 2M
t12 = vC,4·uT,0; t13 = vC,4+vC,5; t14 = uT,0+uT,1;
t15 =t13·t14; T16 = vC,0+t12; vT,1 = vC,1+t15+t12+T3; vT,2 = vC,2+T11+T3;
vT,3 = vC,3+T10;
6 u3(x)=Monic
 
f(x)+vT(x)+vT(x)2
uT(x)
 
, u3(x)=e0+e1x+e2x2+x3 1M+2S 1M+2S
e2 =( vT,3)2; t17 =( vT,2)2; t18 = e2·uT,2; e1 = uT,2+ f5; e0 = uT,1+t17+t18+ f4;
7 v3(x)=vT(x)+1 mod u3(x), v3(x)=ε0+ε1x+ε2x2 3M 2.3 M
(t19,t20,t21)=vT,3·(e0,e1,e2); ε0 =t19+T16; ε1 =t20+vT,1; ε2 =t21+vT,2;
Total 1I+1 1M+1 1S1I+9 . 3M+1 1S
Variable schedule for the genus 3 doubling formula
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
uC,4 vC,5 vC,4 vC,3 vC,2 vC,1 vC,0 uT,1 t6 t0 t1 t2 uC,0 uC,2
uT,0 t15 t13 vT,3 vT,2 vT,1 T16 e0 uT,2 t5 t4 t7 T3 t8
t14 t18 e1 t9 T10 T11 t20 t12
t17 e2 t19 ε1 t21
ε0 ε2
39C Genus four formulæ
Addition formula D3 = D1⊕D2
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40Variable schedule for the genus four addition formula (copies indicated by ∗)
0 M00 q1 t47 t57 t69 t74 t79 s3 t155 t161
1 M02 q3 t48 t56 t63 t75 t80 t84 vT,5
2 t3 M03 t52 t70 t76 t86 T89 t156 t163
3 t4 t6 t12 α03 t36 t64 t71 t88 t91 t119 t130 vT,4 t160
4 t5 t7 t13 α13 α∗
02 t40 t43 t55 t60 t65 t72 t78 t83 t85 ˜ s0 t131 t140 vT,3
5 t8 M33 t14 α23 t38 t44 t61 t66 t73 t81 ˜ s1 t126 t132 t141 vT,2
6 M30 t15 α∗
12 t32 t42 t45 t62 t67 ˜ s2 t133 t142 vT,1
7 M31 t16 α02 t33 t46 λ0 T90 t116 t134 t143 T144
8 M32 t17 t18 α12 α∗
01 t34 q0 λ1 t92 t107 t117 t129 t145 t152 t158
9 t9 t19 α∗
03 t26 λ2 t87 t93 t101 t103 t106 t118 t154 t157 t159
10 t10 t20 α01 t27 T37 uT,5 t164
11 t11 α∗
13 t28 T41 t104 t108 t111 l0 uT,0 t151 t165
12 M01 l1 uT,1 t153 t162
13 t0 M11 T35 uT,2
14 t1 M21 T21 uT,3
15 t2 M∗
31 T22 uT,4 ε0
16 M∗
32 t23 T39 t77 t100 t120 t127 t148 t166 ε1
17 M22 M∗
33 t24 q2 t54 t82 t94 t102 t123 t128 z6 t149 ε2
18 M23 M∗
30 t25 rt 95 t113 t122 z4 t139 t150 t167 ε3
19 M20 t29 inv0 t53 s 
0 t96 t109 t121 z3 t138 t146 e0
20 M10 t30 inv1 t51 s 
1 t97 t105 t110 t114 t124 z2 t137 t147 e1
21 M12 t31 inv2 t49 t59 s 
2 t98 t125 z1 t136 f∗
7 e2
22 M13 inv3 t50 t58 t68 s 
3 t99 t112 t115 z0 t135 e3
41Doubling formula D3 =[ 2]D1
Inputs:
D1 =[ u1(x),v1(x)], u1(x)=a0 +a1x+a2x2 +a3x3 +x4 and v1(x)=c0 +c1x+c2x2 +c3x3
C : y2 +h(x)y = f(x) with h(x)=h0 ∈ Fq and f(x)=f0 + f1x+ f2x2 + f3x3 + f4x4 + f5x5 + f6x6 + f7x7 +x9
Outputs:
D3 =[ u3(x),v3(x)], u3(x)=e0 +e1x+e2x2 +e3x3 +x4 and v3(x)=ε0 +ε1x+ε2x2 +ε3x3
Step Operations Cost Effective
1 uC(x)=u1(x)2, uC(x)=uC,0 +uC,2x2 +uC,4x4 +uC,6x6 +x8 4S 4S
uC,0 =( a0)2; uC,2 =( a1)2; uC,4 =( a2)2; uC,6 =( a3)2;
2 vC(x)=v1(x)2 + f(x) mod uC(x), vC(x)=vC,0 +vC,1x+vC,2x2 +vC,3x3 +vC,4x4 +vC,5x5 +vC,6x6 +vC,7x7 4S 4S
t0 =( c0)2; t1 =( c1)2; t2 =( c2)2; t3 =( c3)2; vC,0 = f0 +t0; vC,1 = f1 +uC,0;
vC,2 = f2 +t1; vC,3 = f3 +uC,2; vC,4 = f4 +t2; vC,5 = f5 +uC,4; vC,6 = f6 +t3;
vC,7 = f7 +uC,6;
3 computation of inverses 1I+5M+4S 1I+4 . 7M+4S
t4 = vC,7 ·vC,5; T5 =( vC,6)2; t6 =( vC,7)2; t7 =t6 ·uC,6; t8 = T5 +t4 +t7;
t9 = vC,7 ·t8;
If t9 is 0 use Cantor’s algorithm
t10 = 1/t9; (t11,t12)=t10 ·(t6,t8); e3 =( t11)2; uT,1 =( t12)2;
4 uT (x)=Monic
 
f(x)+vC(x)+vC(x)2
uC(x)
 
, uT (x)=uT,0 +uT,1x+uT,2x2 +uT,4x4 +x6 6M+2S 5M+2S
t13 =( vC,5)2; t14 =( vC,4)2; (t15,t16,t17)=uT,1 ·(T5,t13,t14); uT,4 =t15 +uC,6;
(t18,t19)=uT,4 ·(uC,6,uC,4); uT,2 =t18 +t16 +uC,4; t20 = uC,6 ·uT,2;
uT,0 =t19 +t17 +uC,2 +t20;
5 vT (x)=vC(x)+1 mod uT (x), vT (x)=vT,0 +vT,1x+vT,2x2 +vT,3x3 +vT,4x4 +vT,5x5 7M 5.6 M
(t21,t22,t23)=vC,6 ·(uT,0,uT,4,uT,1); (t24,t25,t26)=vC,7 ·(uT,2,uT,0,uT,4);
t27 = vC,6 +vC,7; t28 = uT,1 +uT,2; t29 =t27 ·t28; T30 = vC,0 +t21;
vT,1 = vC,1 +t23 +t25; vT,2 = vC,2 +t29 +t23 +t24; vT,3 = vC,3 +t24; vT,4 = vC,4 +t22;
vT,5 = vC,5 +t26;
6 u3(x)=Monic
 
f(x)+vT (x)+vT (x)2
uT (x)
 
, u3(x)=e0 +e1x+e2x2 +e3x3 +x4 4M+2S 3 . 3M+2S
t31 =( vT,3)2; t32 =( vT,4)2; t33 = f7 +uT,4; t34 = f6 +t31;
(t35,e1,t36)=e3 ·(t34,t33,t32); e2 = t36 +uT,4; t37 = e2 ·uT,4; e0 =t35 +uT,2 +t37;
7 v3(x)=vT (x)+1 mod u3(x), v3(x)=ε0 +ε1x+ε2x2 +ε3x3 6M 5.1 M
(t38,t39)=vT,5 ·(e1,e3); t40 = vT,4 +t39; t41 = t40 +vT,5; t42 = e0 +e1;
t43 = e2 +e3; (t44,t45)=t40 ·(e0,e2); (t46,t47)=t41 ·(t42,t43); ε0 = T30 +t44;
ε1 = vT,1 +t46 +t38 +t44; ε2 = vT,2 +t38 +t45; ε3 = vT,3 +t47 +t39 +t45;
Total 1I+2 8M+1 6S 1I+2 3 . 7M+1 6S
Variable schedule for the genus 4 doubling formula
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
uC,2 uC,4 uC,6 t0 t1 t2 t3 vC,0 vC,1 vC,2 vC,3 vC,4 vC,5 vC,6 vC,7 uC,0 t12 t17 e3
t24 t25 t26 T5 t6 t7 t8 T30 vT,1 vT,2 vT,3 vT,4 vT,5 t27 t39 t4 t16 t23
t34 t33 t32 t18 t13 t10 uT,1 ε0 ε1 ε2 ε3 t40 t38 t9 t22 t36
t41 t42 t37 uT,2 t19 t14 t29 t11 e1 e2
t43 t44 uT,0 uT,4 t47 t15
t28 t46 t20
t31 t21
t45 t35
e0
42